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STATE TAXATION OF ENERGY RESOURCES: 
AFFIRMATION OF COMMONWEALTH EDISON 
COMPANY V. MONTANA 
Carol L. Powers* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A decade ago, Colstrip Montana was a close-knit ranching com-
munity of 200 people. 1 The town suffered from economic stagnation 
and the regional emigration of its youth, as it lay sleepily upon the 
nation's richest coal reserves. 2 Colstrip's quiet existence changed 
radically in the early 1970's when the OPEC oil embargo resulted in 
a renewed national focus on the development of domestic coal 
reserves. Within one year Colstrip's population exploded to 2,000 
people to meet the manpower needs of the coal industry. 3 The town's 
present population of 5,5004 requires expanded and expensive public 
services - new schools, increased hospital facilities, upgraded roads, 
sufficient housing, and an expanded water supply - all to be pro-
vided by the state and local governments.5 Colstrip is but one of the 
many western towns directly affected by the increased national de-
mand for coal. 
Many of the residents of the energy producing states of the West 
and South perceive themselves as victims of colonial exploitation, 6 
• Staff Member, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW. 
1. Coal Severance Tax: Hearing on S. 2695 before the Senate Committee on Energy and 
Natural Resources, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 340, 341 (Aug. 6, 1980) (statement of Mont. State 
Sen. Thomas E. Towe). [Hereinafter cited as Coal Severance Tax Hearing]. 
2. Western Energy Company Factsheet on Colstrip, Montana (1981). 
3. Conversation with Bill Schwarzkoph, Reclamation Supervisor, Western Energy Com-
pany, Colstrip, Montana (Jan. 8, 1982). 
4.Id. 
5. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 141 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. Malcolm 
Wallop). 
6. These states include Montana, Wyoming, North Dakota, and Louisiana. Federal Pre-
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and feel that the unique environmental and social characteristics of 
their energy-rich areas are being sacrificed to the nation's energy 
demands. 7 As a result, these states are turning to the legislative 
process to develop revenue measures designed to compensate them 
for the significant costs of resource development. 8 Many state 
legislatures have enacted or presently are enacting taxes on energy 
resource production activities within their borders.9 These energy 
resource taxes are in fact generating tremendous revenues. The four 
largest energy-producing states - California, Alaska, Louisiana, 
and Texas - are expected to receive over $100 billion from resource 
development revenues during the 1980's.1° With these incoming 
riches, the energy-producing states are able to increase public serv-
ices, lower their income tax and property tax rates, and attract in-
dustry to their more favorable economic environments. 
Twenty-five hundred miles away from Colstrip, Montana, the 
fragmented industrial cities of the Northeast and Midwestll are 
facing extremely difficult financial and social problems. Confronted 
with the possibility of bankruptcy, many of these cities have averted 
financial disaster only by enacting heavy tax increases combined 
with drastic service cuts and worker layoffs. 12 These urban areas are 
centers of unemployment and unrest; yet they must pay much more 
for the same amount of energy than consumers in other parts of the 
country - in some cases up to 97 percent more. 13 Understandably, 
emption of State Energy Policies: Hearings before the Subcomm. on Limitations of Contracted 
and Delegated Authority of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 2cl Sess. 45 (Oct. 
14 and 20, 1980) (statement of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe); id. at 58 (statement of 
North Dakota Att'y Gen. Allen 1. Olson) [hereinafter cited as Federal Preemption of State 
Energy Policies Hearings]. 
7. Id. at 143 (App., paper of Prof. Daniel H. Henning). 
8. See infra text at notes 148-84. 
9. Colorado (1978) and North Dakota (1977) enacted severance taxes on coal; Montana 
(1975) and New Mexico (1977) revised their coal severance tax rates. Church, Conflicting 
Federal, State and Local Interest Trends in State and Local Ener1/Y Taxation, 31 NAT'L TAX. 
J. 269, 271 (1978); Commerce Clause and the Severance Tax: Hearings on Fiscal Disparities 
before the Subcomm. on InterglYVernmental Relations of the Senate Comm. on Governmental Af-
fairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 108 (July 15-16, 1981) (statement of Shirley Kallek, Bureau of the 
Census). [Hereinafter cited as Commerce Clause Hearings] (Note: pagination is to unofficial 
copy of Hearings). 
10. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 107 (citing Minneapolis Star, May 12, 
1980). 
11. Such cities include New York City, Boston, Cleveland, Chicago, Buffalo, Philadelphia, 
and Washington, D. C. See Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 94 (citing Washington 
Post, Apr. 20, 1980). 
12.Id. 
13. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 97 (citing U.S. News & World Report, 
June 16, 1980). 
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these states are complaining about the economic burden placed upon 
them by the energy resource taxation of the producing states. Fear-
ing domestic cartelization of the energy resource market, the 
energy-importing states of the North and East are forming coali-
tions to fight for a larger share of the nation's energy wealth.14 
Conflict has arisen over the taxes levied by energy-producing 
states which ultimately must be paid by residents of energy-
importing states.15 Not only a newsworthy topic of public interest,16 
this conflict also poses an important legal question of constitutional 
federalism: 17 the extent to which a state's authority to tax must be 
balanced with federal interests in implementing cohesive national 
energy policies.18 Present federal energy policy includes a commit-
ment to increase coal consumption in order to decrease dependence 
on foreign energy supplies.19 Difficulties arise in attempting to 
weigh the need for a state's coal severance tax against the need for a 
national energy policy. 20 
14. [d. 
15. See infra text at notes 53-65. 
16. See Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 94-112. 
17. The Constitution's Commerce Clause grants to Congress the power "to regulate com-
merce ... among the several states." U.S. CaNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. It was adopted to overcome 
interstate rivalries and territorial protection of local economic interests. Browde & DuMars, 
State Taxation of Natural Resource Extraction and the Commerce Clause: Federalism's 
Modern Frontier, 60 OR. L. REV. 7 (1981). This grant of authority provides the necessary 
federal regulatory power to free national commerce from acts of economic retribution by com-
peting states. Accompanying the positive grant of federal regulatory authority is the negative 
implication that states may not invade that special federal province. A flexible balancing ap-
proach between federal and state commercial interests has been the hallmark of commerce 
clause adjudication. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-7, 5-8 (1978). 
18. Inherent in the form of federalism created by the Constitution, federal-state tensions 
are especially manifest in the state sovereignty evidenced by that very state power. The tenth 
amendment is viewed as a check on congressional commerce clause powers. "The powers not 
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are 
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CaNST. amend. X. 
The Supreme Court in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) stated: "Con-
gress may not exercise [its Commerce Clause power] so as to force directly upon the States its 
choices as to how essential decisions regarding the conduct of integral governmental functions 
are to be made." [d. at 855. The taxing authority exercised by a state is an integral govern-
mental function, both because the state depends upon the power to tax for its economic viabili-
ty and because the taxing power is a legitimate function of the state as an autonomous entity. 
See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 10 (1824). 
19. See infra text at notes 229-38. 
20. The decision in Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery traditionally has given strength to tenth 
amendment claims of legitimate exercise of state powers, but it should be remembered that 
the Court's majority holding in this case was the result of a swing vote by Justice Blackmun. 
See 426 U.S. 833, 856 (1976) (Blackmun, J., concurring). His framing of the issue was not 
based on whether the federal action interferred with state and local decisionmaking; rather, 
the issue was only whether there is a balance that should be weighed in favor of federal or 
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A coal severance tax is a privilege tax which is due when the coal is 
extracted, or "severed" from the ground.21 The rate of the tax is 
based either on the market value or quantity of the coal removed or 
sold.22 The tax is paid most often by the producer of the coal. 23 Most 
coal producers operate under the provisions of long-term contracts 
with electric utilities which specify the amounts and qualities of the 
coal to be produced.24 These long-term supply contracts require the 
utilities to pay the producers' costs, including state-levied taxes. The 
impact of a state's coal severance tax is, thus, passed on to the utili-
ty.25 In turn, most electric utilities are publicly regulated and, as 
such, are allowed to pass through their increased costs to the utility 
consumer - the individual who is heating, cooling, and lighting his 
home. This consumer, most often residing in a state other than 
where the coal is produced, ultimately pays a coal severance tax.26 
Amid the complex and competing economic, sociological, and 
political clamor over state taxation of energy resources, the Su-
preme Court heard the case of Commonwealth Edison Company v. 
Montana. 27 The contest concerned the legitimacy of Montana's 30 
percent tax on the extraction of coal. 28 In spite of assertions by coal 
producers and utilities that the rate of the tax inhibited interstate 
commerce, the state's coal severance tax was upheld.29 The Court 
declined to fashion a legal test which would determine the ap-
propriateness of resource taxation rates. As a result, the decision in 
Commonwealth Edison leaves a persistent and unresolved question: 
who should decide the appropriate level of energy resource taxation 
- the state legislatures or the United States Congress? 
state regulations. Id. Accord, Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra 
note 6, at 111 (statement of Prof. Jan Laitos). 
21. [1979)2 STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 145-000. 
22. See infra text at notes 48-52. 
23. [1979) 2 STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH) 1 45-000. A few states provide that payment of the 
severance tax is to be made by the first purchaser, unless the product is not sold within a 
specified period following severance, in which case the tax is to be paid by the producer. 
Statutes may provide that acts necessary to separate, refine or finish a product are considered 
part of the production, and if carried on by more than one person, the tax will be allocated to 
the value of the product in each stage. Id. 
24. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY, COAL COMPETITION PROSPECTS Fon THE 1980's, 46 Fed. Reg. 
10,686-10,704 (1981) [hereinafter cited as COAL COMPETITION). 
25. Id. at 10,700. 
26. See Appellant's Complaint 1 17-18 (No. 80-581, filed Oct. 1980), Commonwealth Edison 
Company v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS (BNA) 13 Tax Series 9, 
at 97-98 (1981) [hereinafter cited as LAW REPRINTS). See infra text at notes 53-65. 
27. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
28. MONT. REV. CODE ANN. § 17-35-101-11 (1981). 
29. 453 U.S. 609 (1981). 
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This article will address the troublesome topic of state taxation of 
energy resources, with a focus on coal severance taxes.30 First, the 
recent case of Commonwealth Edison will be considered. The issues 
and arguments will be presented as well as the decisions of the Mon-
tana Courts and the United States Supreme Court. Second, the prop-
er decisionmaking forum for fashioning an equitable resource tax 
will be analyzed. The state legislature's unique closeness to the ac-
tual costs involved in resource development at the state and local 
levels will be examined as well as the rationales for enactment of a 
severance tax in particular. Congress' interest in a cohesive and 
workable national energy policy will also be examined, primarily in 
light of the federal government's unclear enunciation of a national 
coal policy and the inefficient management of coal development to 
date. Finally, alternatives to the current development of the gross 
fiscal disparities between energy-producing and energy-importing 
states will be proposed. 
II. COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY V. MONTANA 
A. The Underlying Issues 
The Montana coal severance tax rate of 30 percent of market value 
is the highest energy resource severance tax in the nation.31 The 
midwestern utilities which purchase the major portion of Montana 
coal pay the severance tax and then pass on their costs to individual 
consumers.32 Those consumers bear the burden of a tax upon which 
they have no vote.33 Both the rate of the Montana coal severance tax 
and who must pay that tax were key issues in the case of Com-
monwealth Edison Company v. Montana. 34 The Supreme Court, 
however, refused to apply an explicit standard of review to either 
30. As discussed in this article, state taxation of energy resources includes a variety of tax 
measures; however, focus will be given to severance taxes imposed on the extraction of energy 
resources. Particular attention will be paid to the taxation of coal, specifically the Montana 
coal severance tax. See generally Browde and DuMars, supra note 17; Hellerstein, Constitu-
tional Constraints on State and Local Taxation of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 245 
(1978); Parnell, Constitutional Considerations of Federal Control over the Sovereign Taxing 
Authority of the States, 28 CATH. U.L. REV. 227 (1979); Bassett, Constitutional Limitations on 
State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. RESOURCES J. 887 (1980). 
31. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 86 (citing Energy: Limiting State Coal 
Severance Taxes, Report by the Congressional Research Service (1980». 
32. Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 619-20 & n.8 (1981); Jurisdic-
tional Statement of Appellees at 4, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 
(1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 18. 
33. Id. Ninety percent of the value of Montana's entire coal production was shipped out-of-
state.ld. 
34. 453 U.S. 609, 617-624 (1981). 
508 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:503 
issue. The Court stated that severance tax rates are to be deter-
mined by the state legislatures, unless those rates act contrary to 
federal interests.35 The Court went on to say that the consumers of 
electricity generated by Montana coal should pay for the benefits 
which they receive from Montana.36 The following discussion, which 
introduces the Montana coal severance tax and explores the manner 
in which it is "exported" to residents of other states, provides the 
background necessary to an understanding of the arguments and 
decisions in the Commonwealth Edison case. 
1. The Tax 
As a result of the 1973 OPEC oil embargo, the nation looked to the 
development of huge coal reserves held by the Western states37 as an 
answer to its energy dilemma. The Montana state legislature 
recognized the coal industry's increasing impact and demands upon 
the state and, in 1974, appointed an interim subcommittee to study 
the existing state tax structure and recommend changes.38 At that 
time, the state's revenue system included a tax on the net proceeds 
of all mining activities,39 a resource indemnity trust tax,40 a mining 
license tax,41 and property taxes on mining equipment.42 The sub-
committee recommended revision of two aspects of Montana's taxa-
tion of coal production. The mining license tax, a severance tax 
measured as a percentage of the quantity of the coal extracted, was 
to be revised to reflect not only the quantity but also the quality of 
the coal produced.43 The net proceeds tax was, at the time, a levy on 
35. Id. at 624·25, 628. 
36. Id. at 622-23. 
37. This coal-rich area in the Northern Great Plains region encompasses eastern portions of 
Montana and Wyoming and western sections of North Dakota. Pederal Preemption of State 
Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 129 (App., paper of Prof. Daniel H. Henning). 
38. Three resolutions, HR. 45, 63 and SR. 83, were passed in the 1974 Montana state 
legislature which recognized the coal industry's increasingly important role in the state and 
established the interim subcommittee of the Taxation Committee. 
39. See 1974 MONT. LAWS 1619-1620, 1653-54, 1683-84 (Mar. 14 & 16, 1974). MONT. CODE 
ANN. § 15-23-501 (1981). 
40. MONT. CODE ANN. S 15-38-104 (1981) levies a tax on mineralJProduction at the rate of 1/2 
of 1 percent of gross value at the time of extraction. MONT. Com: ANN. § 15-38-106(2) (1981) 
then provides for deposit of those funds in a resource indemnity trust account. 
41. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-31-101 (1981) and its subsection 121(1) provide for a mining 
license tax of 6 3/4 percent of all net income. In addition, MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-58-102 (1981) 
establishes a license tax to retail coal which is levied at the rate of 5 cents per ton. 
42. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-6-138(1)(b) (1981) taxes mining machinery at 11 percent of its 
market value. MONT. CODE ANN. S 15-6-140(1)(d) (1981) taxes coal haulers at 16 percent of 
value. 
43. MONTANA COAL COUNCIL REPORT: DEVELOPMENT OF MONTANA'S 30% SEVERANCE TAX 1 
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all mining activities, providing deductions for certain production 
costs. The subcommittee suggested enactment of a gross proceeds 
tax on the coal mining industry in particular, allowing no deductions 
for production costs and providing the state with revenues needed to 
meet the financial demands associated with coal development.44 
These two tax reforms were enacted by the Montana state 
legislature in 1975.45 
Opponents of the Montana coal severance tax accuse the state of 
taking advantage of its favorable energy position and its coal 
customers. Montana, however, had a severance tax in place before 
the increased production began in the early 1970's.46 Furthermore, 
the state legislature reviewed the proposed tax reforms carefully 
and observed: 
[i]n the level of the tax, the conference committee looked at the 
needs to be met. The objectives were to (a) preserve or modestly 
increase revenues going to the general fund, (b) to respond to 
current social impacts attributable to coal development, and (c) 
to invest in the future when new energy technologies reduce our 
dependence on coal and mining activities may decline. The con-
ference concluded that a severance tax of 20% on low-grade 
lignite and 30% on other coal, plus a gross proceeds tax running 
around 4-5% on all coal was necessary and equitableY 
The state has not imposed the tax to exploit the consumers of other 
states at a time of increased coal demand. 
The present Montana coal severance tax is computed on factors of 
value, energy content, and method of extraction of the coal pro-
duced.48 The value of the coal is determined by the contract sales 
price which is defined as the "price of coal extracted and prepared 
for shipment f.o.b. (free on board) mine, excluding that amount 
(prepared for informational use by James D. Mockler) (1981) [hereinafter cited as MONTANA 
COAL COUNCIL REPORT). 
44. [d. 
45. The 1975 Montana legislature actually considered two basic severance tax bills - HB 
115 and SB 13. The two bills were comparable except the Senate proposed a tax of 25 percent 
of the coal's value and the House proposed a tax of 20 percent of value less production taxes. 
Following passage by the respective houses, conference committees were appointed to work 
out the differences. The conference committee bill was adopted in 1975. [d. at 2. See MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1981). 
46. See supra note 9. 
47. REPORT OF THE MONTANA FREE JOINT CONFERENCE COMM. ON COAL TAXATION 1 (1975). 
48. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-103 (1981). 
The Montana coal severance tax provision is set forth below: 
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charged by the seller to pay taxes paid on production."49 The tax is 
levied upon coal producers mining coal in the state of Montana. 
These producers generally operate under the provisions of long-term 
supply contracts with the purchasers of the coal. The contract sales 
price reflects the heating quality of the coal as well as its method of 
extraction. In addition, the price includes any taxes paid by the pro-
ducers in order to mine the coal. 
The rate of the tax is progressive, increasing with the increased 
BTU50 output of each pound of coal. 51 The rate varies based on 
whether an underground mining or surface mining procedure is 
used, ranging from 3 to 4 percent of the value of underground mined 
coal to 20 to 30 percent of the value of surface mined coal. The tax 
reflects the premium cost to the state of high quality surface strip-
mined coal. 52 
[d. 
Severance tax - rates imposed - exemptions. 
(1) A severance tax is imposed on each ton of coal produced in the state in accordance 
with the followillg schedule: 
Heating quality (BTU per 
pound of coal) Surface Mining Underground Mining 
Under 7,000 12 cents or i5 cents or 
20% of value 3 % of value 
7,000-8,000 22 cents or 8 cents or 
30% of value 4 % of value 
8,000-9,000 34 cents or 10 cents or 
30% of value 4% of value 
Over 9,000 40 cents or 1!~ cents or 
30% of value 4 % of value 
"Value" means the contract sales price. 
(2) The formula which yields the greater amount of tax in a particular case shall be 
used at each point on this schedule. 
(3) A person is not liable for any severance tax upon 20,000 tons of the coal he pro-
duces in a calendar year. 
49. MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-35-102(1) (1981). In an f.o.b., free on board, contract the seller 
must get the goods to the point named in the contract at his own expense and risk. See U.C.C. § 
2-319(1); J. CALAMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS 511 n.4 (2d ed. 1977). 
50. A BTU is a British thermal unit which is the quantity of heat required to raise the 
temperature of one pound of water by one degree Fahrenheit. Analysis of state energy taxa-
tion should be in terms of amounts paid per BTU - the comparison of tax rates alone is useless 
unless one also knows how much energy a particular commodity will produce. See Federal 
Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 78 (statement of Mont. Att'y 
Gen. Mike Greely). 
51. See supra note 48. 
52. Surface mining is not encouraged by the state because of the significant disruption to 
the environment. For a discussion of reclamation requirements, see infra text and notes at 
notes 165-71. 
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2. Exporting the Tax 
Montana's coal severance tax is fiercely challenged because its 
burden is ultimately borne by out-of-state utility consumers. The 
practical economic scheme of the utilities' use of coal are responsible 
for this outcome. Severance taxes are usually paid directly by the 
severor or producer of the resource. 53 The long-term supply con-
tracts between producers and utility company purchasers reflect 
coal production costs. Prior to the recent increase in coal develop-
ment, these contracts set fixed prices for a specified range of coal 
quality and were rarely renegotiated. Supply contracts now provide 
for frequent adjustments to account for tax and price increases. 54 
Consequently, these cost increases, paid directly by the coal pro-
ducers and indirectly by the utility company purchasers, are passed 
through to the utility's consumer via automatic fuel adjustment 
charges.55 
The question of who actually pays the tax is an important tax 
policy issue. 56 A state may structure a portion of its tax system to 
shift the burden of payment to fall upon out-of-state consumers of 
goods produced in state. When out-of-state consumers bear the tax 
burden it is in effect "exported."57 The exportation of state taxes is a 
well-known practice in public finance and is important to most 
states' fiscal systems.58 For example, Nevada exports a substantial 
portion of its taxes in the form of gambling taxes; Delaware does the 
same with its corporate franchise tax; as does Michigan with a pro-
duction tax on automobiles; Florida with a sales tax geared to raise 
revenue from tourists; North Carolina from tobacco; California from 
produce and vineyards; and New York from its stock exchange 
53. See supra text and note at note 23. 
54. Church, supra note 9, at 270. 
55. Id. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 18 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. Alan 
K. Simpson). 
Both New York and Connecticut have attempted to disallow the pass-through of increased 
energy resource costs to individual consumers. This anti-pass-through legislation was struck 
down by the courts, which found preemption by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 
1973, 15 U.S.C. §§ 751-760h (1976), and regulations adopted thereunder, 10 C.F.R. 
§ 212.83(cX2XiiiXEX7) (1981), which permit the pass-through of increased costs and which pro-
hibit any price control or regulation. See Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tully, 639 F.2d 912 (2d Cir. 1981); 
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Dubro, 639 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1981). 
56. See D. PHARES. STATE-LOCAL TAX EQUITY: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTY STATES 
7-17 (1973). 
57. Church, supra note 9, at 276. 
58. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 19 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. Alan K. 
Simpson); D. PHARES. supra note 56, at 34, 39. 
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transactions.59 Not surprisingly, strong political incentives exist for 
state legislatures to shift taxes to voters in other states. 
Severance taxes are more amenable to exportation than certain 
other types of tax because the resource which is taxed is itself ex-
ported. Despite the exportability of coal, the automatic adjustment 
in coal supply contracts to reflect tax and price increases combines 
with the immobility and longevity of the mine itself to lock in the cur-
rent purchaser utility to bear the tax burden.60 As a result, the Mon-
tana severance tax is challenged as an unfair exaction from those 
states which rely on Montana coal. 
As a practical matter, the tax burden borne by the consumers of 
electric utilities fueled by Montana coal is extremely light. The 
burden placed on these consumers by their own states in the form of 
sales taxes on the consumption of electricity far exceeds the cost of a 
severance tax.61 Moreover, a severance tax is a miniscule part of the 
final cost of coal. The total price must include mining costs, reclama-
tion costs, surface owner payments, landowners' royalties, black 
lung insurance, abandoned mine and reclamation fund charges, 
bonding costs, federal withholding and corporate income taxes, 
workmen's compensation, federal unemployment taxes, union pen-
sion benefits, union wages, construction of the resource-producing 
facility, rail transportation charges, and, of course, a reasonable 
59. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 142, 153, 154 (statement of Wyo. U.S. 
Rep. Dick Cheney). 
60. Church, supra note 9, at 277. McLure, Economic Constraints on State and Local Taxa· 
tion of Energy Resources, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 257·259 (1978). Because exportation of tax burdens 
requires market dominance, with market substitutions unavailable, production sites immobile, 
and a centralized market structure, some commentators conclude that energy resource taxes 
are not effectively exported and that the owners of the capital and resources pay for the tax. 
Id. 
61. In 1979, each Midwestern utilities consumer's bill reflected an annual cost to pay the 
Montana severance tax of between $0.78 to $4.07. That consumer also was required to pay the 
local taxes levied on consumption which ranged from $8.10 to $26.64. Coal Severance Tax 
Hearing, supra note I, at 48 (recorded statement of N.M. U.S. Sen. Pete Domenici); id. at 
135-36 (statement of Mont. U.S. Sen. John Melcher, Attachment # 3); Federal Preemption of 
State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 77,78 (statement of Mont. Att'y Gen. Mike 
Greely). In addition, Montana's coal severance tax is completely within the range of taxes im-
posed by other states when expressed in dollars per million BTUs. Consider the following: 
Taxes on Texas oil yield 8.84 cents per million BTUs 
Montana coal yield 9.97 cents per million BTUs 
New Mexico oil yield 10.76 cents per million BTUs 
Oklahoma oil yield 12.58 cents per million BTUs 
Louisiana oil yield 16.58 cents per million BTUs 
Cool Severance Tax Hearing, supra note I, at 138 (statement of Mont. U.S. Sen. John 
Melcher, Attachment # 5). 
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return on investment.62 The cost of Montana's coal severance tax to 
the midwestern utility consumers is negligible. 
Although coal severance taxes are a small portion of a utility con-
sumer's bill, the argument remains that, unprotected by suffrage, 
those consumers bear an unfair burden. Without a voice in the level 
or operation of the tax, they claim that it is unjust. In order to pro-
tect their consumers' interests and to protest the rate of the tax, 
four coal producers63 and eleven utility company purchasers64 filed 
suit against Montana in state court,65 challenging the coal severance 
tax. 
B. The Arguments 
In 1978, a suit challenging the Montana coal severance tax was 
brought in the Montana State District Court. Contesting the con-
stitutional validity of the tax, the plaintiff producers and utilities 
sought refunds of taxes, paid under protest, amounting to over $5.4 
million. They contended that the tax was invalid under both the com-
merce66 and supremacy clauses67 of the United States Constitution. 
The producers and utilities argued that the Montana tax unlawful-
ly conflicts with the commerce clause by discriminating against in-
Moreover, on a BTU comparison, the cost of western coal including severance taxes is 
almost half the cost of Appalachian coal. In 1978, the average production costs for steam coal, 
expressed on a cents per million BTU basis, were 95 cents for Kentucky coal and 37 cents for 
Montana coal. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 22 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. 
Alan K. Simpson); Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 78 
(statement of Mont. Att'y Gen. Mike Greely). 
62. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 13·14 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. Alan 
K. Simpson). 
63. The four Montana coal producers were Decker Coal Company, Peabody Coal Company, 
Westmoreland Resources, Inc., and Western Energy Company. 
64. The eleven public utility companies were Commonwealth Edison Company, Central Il-
linois Light Company, Dairyland Power Cooperative, Detroit Edison Company, Interstate 
Power Company, Lake Superior District Power Company, Lower Colorado River 
Authority/City of Austin, Minnesota Power and Light Company, Northern States Power Com-
pany, Upper Peninsula Generating Company, and Wisconsin Power and Light Company. 
These utility company consumers reside in Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Michigan, 
Texas, North Dakota, and South Dakota. Appellant's Complaint " 12.1-12.11, Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra 
note 26, at 94-95. 
65. It is interesting to note that a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (1976), forced the 
severance tax contest to be brought in the state court where the tax was imposed. State courts 
may be more favorably inclined to the state's position, and the tactics of motions to dismiss for 
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted and motions for summary judgment 
are easily employed. The Montana District Court granted the state's motion to dismiss and, 
consequently, a full factual record was never developed. See Bassett, supra note 30, at 91 0-11. 
66. See supra, notes 17-18; infra, note 210. 
67. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See infra text at note 83. 
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terstate commerce in its imposition of an excessive burden on out-of-
state utility consumers. They contended that proper commerce 
clause analysis would address the practical effects of the tax and 
would balance the costs actually incurred by the state with the costs 
to the utility consumer.68 Under this balancing test, the tax was 
challenged as producing revenues not fairly related to the services 
provided by the Montana state government. 
Judicial review of state taxation of energy resources first began in 
the 1920's. The Supreme Court decided three such cases, known as 
the Heisler trilogy,69 by applying a mechanical commerce clause test 
which examined whether the taxed activity was considered to be "in 
commerce" or to have "preceded commerce."70 In each of the three 
68. The producers and utilities advocated use of a balancing test to determine whether the 
severance tax was valid under the commerce clause. The test, which was formulated in the 
U.S. Supreme Court decision of Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), 
upholds a tax if it "is not discriminatory and is properly apportioned to local activities within 
the State forming a sufficient nexus to support the tax." Id. at 285. That test was recently ap· 
plied by the Court in Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 447 U.S. 207 (1980), to 
determine whether the tax "is applied to an activity with a substantial nexus ,..nth the taxing 
state, is fairly apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly 
related to the services provided by the State." Id. at 228. The producers and utilities were con· 
tending that the last prong of the test was not met by the Montana coal severance tax. 
69. Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 (1927) (privilege tax on natural gas produc-
tion in West Virginia); Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923) (occupation tax on 
iron ore and other mining business in Minnesota); Heisler v. Thomas Colliery Co., 260 U.S. 245 
(1922) (production tax on anthracite coal mined in Pennsylvania). 
70. The mere fact that a state product was destined to be shipped out of state would not in-
validate a tax which was levied on commercial activities within the state's borders. The Court 
stated its concerns about state taxation of commercial activities in the early case of Coe v. Er-
rol, 116 U.S. 517 (1886). 
It seems to us untenable to hold that a crop or a herd is exempt from taxation mere-
ly because it is, by its owner, intended for exportation. If such were the rule in many 
States there would be nothing but the lands and real estate to bear the taxes. Some of 
the Western States produce very little except wheat and corn, most of which is in-
tended for export; and so of cotton in the Southern States. Certainly, as long as these 
products are on the lands which produce them, they are part of the general property 
of the State. And so we think they continue to be until they have entered upon their 
final journey for leaving the State and going into another State. 
Id. at 527-28. 
The Heisler Court was equally concerned about the effects of placing in-state production ac-
tivities under commerce clause scrutiny: 
It would nationalize all industries, it would nationalize and withdraw from state 
jurisdiction and deliver to federal commercial control the fruits of California and the 
South, the wheat of the West and its meats, the cotton of the South, the shoes of 
Massachusetts and the woolen industries of other States, at the very inception of 
their production or growth, that is, the fruits unpicked, the cotton and wheat 
ungathered, hides and flesh of cattle yet "on the hoof," wool yet unshorn, and coal yet 
unmined, because they are in varying percentages destined for and surely to be ex-
ported to States other than those of their production. 
260 U.S. 245, 259-260 (1922). 
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cases, the Court held that the act of extracting minerals precedes the 
entrance of those minerals into the flow of interstate commerce. No 
further inquiry into the practical effects of the tax was deemed rele-
vant because no actual participation in interstate commerce had 
been found.71 The imposition of a state severance tax was upheld 
against a commerce clause challenge in each case. 
In challenging the Montana severance tax the producers and 
utilities tried to distinguish the Heisler decisions by arguing that the 
correct commerce clause analysis was developed by the Supreme 
Court in another line of cases under Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. 
Brady.72 There, the Court adopted a more flexible approach, focus-
ing on the practical effect of the challenged tax rather than whether 
the taxed activity was or was not "in commerce." The Court held 
that a state tax does not offend the commerce clause if it "is applied 
to an activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly 
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and 
is fairly related to services provided by the state."73 The producers 
and utilities contended that the Montana tax does discriminate 
against interstate commerce and is not fairly related to services pro-
vided by the state.74 Thus, the tax violates the commerce clause 
under the test formulated in Complete Auto Transit. In addition to 
the commerce clause claim, the petitioners argued that the Montana 
coal severance tax conflicts with the supremacy clause because the 
levy in effect decreases coal development by increasing prices. 75 
Their first contention on the supremacy clause challenge was that 
the Montana tax improperly reduces revenues received by the 
federal government from federal lands leasing, thereby frustrating 
the statutory division of revenues established in the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act of 1920.76 That Act developed a system of sharing with 
the states the revenues received by the federal government from its 
leasing of public mineral lands. 77 The producers and utilities charged 
Montana with altering that balance by receiving revenues from 
71. See Browde & DuMars, supra note 17, at 18-21. 
72. 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (upholding a privilege tax on motor carriers). See supra note 68. 
73. 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
74. See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 20-22, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 34-36. 
75. See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 25-26, Commonwealth v. Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 39-40. 
76. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-209 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See Appellant's Complaint" 42-44, Com-
monwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra 
note 26, at 103. 
77. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). 
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severance taxes as well. They argued further that the supremacy 
clause is at issue in the conflict between federal energy policies 
which encourage the use and production of coal and the Montana 
coal severance tax which increases the cost of coal. The producers 
and utilities' supremacy clause position thus focused on the practical 
effect of the severance tax: the frustration of federallaw. 78 
Countering these constitutional challenges, the state of Montana 
argued that the coal severance tax is a valid exercise of state authori-
ty and any intrusion into its tax-structuring policies would be a gross 
violation of basic constitutional federalism. 79 Montana refuted the 
commerce clause challenge on the ground that there is, iln fact, no 
discrimination in the operation of the tax - it is levied on every ton 
of coal extracted in the state regardless of who produced it or where 
it is marketed.80 The state further argued that it had a legitimate and 
significant interest in requiring interstate business to pay its fair 
share of the costs of state government.81 Montana noted that the tax 
is levied only on the coal industry and that the revenues are used to 
defray the costs incident to that industry's activities. Hence, the tax 
complies with the tests established in both the Heisler trilogy and in 
Complete Auto Transit to evaluate an alleged violation of the com-
merce clause. 
Addressing the supremacy clause challenge, Montana argued that 
the tax cannot be preempted merely because the tax imposes in-
creased costs on congressionally encouraged activity. Montana also 
argued that the tax cannot be in conflict with the Mineral Lands 
Leasing Act of 1920 because the terms of the statute explicitly allow 
state severance taxes to be imposed on the output of federal mines.82 
The state maintained its position that findings of preemption must 
be predicated upon specific rights and regulatory schemes enacted 
by Congress; that general statements of policy do not constitute 
substantive law protected by the supremacy clause. 83 Indeed, Mon-
tana argued that federal legislation recognizes the existence of state 
severance taxes on coal and acknowledges the continued use of such 
78. See Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 22-24, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Mon-
tana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 36-38. 
79. See Brief of Appellees at 44-45, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 
(1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 492-93. 
80. See supra note 48. 
81. See Brief of Appellees at 22-29, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 
(1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 470-77. 
82. 30 U.S.C. S 189 (1976). 
83. Usual principles of preemption analysis require an express, intentional usurpation of 
state regulatory authority by Congress. See L. TRIBE, supra note 17, at 391-400. 
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taxes.84 According to Montana, the petitioner's supremacy clause 
argument was, therefore, unsupportable. 
Finally, the state suggested judicial restraint in such a controversy 
over state taxing power, noting that Congress was already fully in-
volved in the conflict.85 The state argued further that only a 
legislative body is capable of adequately addressing the various con-
siderations necessary to determine a severance tax rate. Thus, Mon-
tana argued, as a practical matter, the state is the appropriate entity 
to administer this tax. 
C. The Court Decisions 
1. The Montana State Courts 
The Montana District Court dismissed the action brought by the 
coal producers and electric utilities, thereby upholding the Montana 
coal severance tax. The court first addressed the commerce clause 
issue by meticulously reviewing prior Supreme Court holdings 
regarding state regulation of commercial activities.86 The Montana 
court applied the so-called "mechanical test" of the Heisler trilogy87 
and held that the extraction of coal preceded its entrance into in-
terstate commerce. The court concluded that the tax did not offend 
the commerce clause and was valid on its face - no factfinding on 
this issue was required. 
The Montana District Court next addressed the supremacy clause 
issue. It upheld the state's position that a direct conflict must exist 
before a federal statute preempts a state enactment. 88 According to 
the court, allegations of substantial frustration of national policies 
84. See Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 8401(a)(2) (1976 & 
Supp. III 1979). 
85. See Brief of Appellees at 33-34, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 
(1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 481-82. 
86. The Montana District Court cited Supreme Court holdings in the area of state taxation 
of commercial activities from 1922 to 1979. LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 216-40 
(unreported opinion). 
87. See supra text at notes 60-6l. The Supreme Court, in Oliver Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 
U.S. 172 (1923), had stated: "Mining is not interstate commerce, but, like manufacturing, is a 
local business subject to local regulation and taxation." Id. at 178. 
88. LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 245. (unreported opinion). The Montana District Court 
cited the Supreme Court decision of Farmers Education & Cooperative Union v. W. Day, Inc., 
360 U.S. 525 (1959) which held: "States should not be held to have been ousted from power 
traditionally held in the absence of either a clear declaration by Congress that it intends to for-
bid the continued functioning of the state law or an obvious and unavoidable conflict between 
the federal and state directives." Id. at 54l. (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). Accord Hines v. 
Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) which held: "In general, the states may exercise any power 
possessed by them prior to the adoption of the Constitution unless the exercise of such power 
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are insufficient to preempt a state statute. The Montana District 
Court went on to find no direct conflict between the Montana coal 
severance tax and the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.89 The 
court disagreed with the producers' and utilities' contention that the 
levy of severance taxes frustrated federal congressional purposes to 
maintain control over all the revenues received from federal lands. 
The court explained that the royalty sharing system created by the 
Act90 expressly allows the state a right to tax the output of federally 
owned lands91 and quoted from the statute: 
Nothing in this chapter shall be construed or held to affect the 
rights of the states or other local authority to exercise any rights 
which they may have, including the right to levy and collect 
taxes upon improvements, output of mines, or other rights, 
property or assets of any lessee of the United States.92 
The Montana District Court also addressed the producers' and 
utilities' argument that federal energy policies encourage coal pro-
duction and therefore preempt Montana's coal severanee tax. The 
court noted that the "tax is not an 'obstacle' to federal policy in a 
constitutional sense merely because it increases the cost or price of a 
product, the use of which Congress encourages or favors. "93 Thus, 
the Montana District Court dismissed the claims that the Montana 
tax was preempted by any federal congressional action. 
On appeal, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's 
conclusions on the constitutional issues presented and upheld the 
is expressly or by necessary implication prohibited thereby or interferes with some power 
delegated to the United States." 312 U.S. at 53 (1941). 
89. 30 U.S.C. § 181-209 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
90. The statutory formula provides for disbursements of 50 percent of the revenues to the 
state in which the mining occurs; 40 percent to the reclamation fund under the Reclamation 
Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 391-401 (1976); and the remaining 10 percent to the U.S. Treasury pursuant 
to 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). See infra text at notes 255-261. 
91. One of the rallying cries for the lobbyists against western coal severance taxes has been 
the emphasis on the public ownership of coal reserves. It is important, therefore, to point out 
that a lease of the mineral rights conveys possession of those minerals to the lessor. The state, 
by taxing the activities of that lessor, in no way infringes on the presently held ownership 
rights of the public. See Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, 
at 85 (statement of Mont. Att'y Gen. Mike Greely). The Court in Mid-Northern Oil Company v. 
Montana, 268 U.S. 45 (1925), held that: 
[a]lthough the [Mineral Lands Leasing] Act deals with the letting of public lands and 
the relations of the government to the lessees thereof, nothing in it shall be so con-
strued as to affect the rights of the states, in respect of such private persons and cor-
porations, to levy and collect taxes as though the government were not c:oncerned. 
Id. at 49. 
92. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1976). 
93. LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 255. 
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coal severance tax.94 The state Supreme Court acquiesced in the use 
of the Heisler mechanical test and held that the tax was levied on an 
activity which preceded interstate commerce, thereby removing it 
from commerce clause scrutiny. Nevertheless, the court acknowl-
edged the possibility that the correct inquiry was under the Complete 
A uto Transit flexible test and remarked that, even if this test ap-
plied, the producers and utilities would not have prevailed.95 The key 
question under the Complete Auto Transit test was whether the tax 
was fairly related to the services provided by the state.96 The state 
Supreme Court concluded that Montana is completely justified in re-
quiring the coal mining industry to assume its share of the costs in-
curred by the state and local governments as the direct result of such 
coal mining.97 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court found the 
severance tax valid under a commerce clause challenge. 98 
The state Supreme Court also affirmed the District Court's find-
ings under the supremacy clause challenges. The court first noted 
that "no national policy can be discerned as a matter of law"99 and, 
therefore, there can be no federal preemption of the state's coal 
severance tax. It next addressed the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 
1920 and agreed that the statute's express allowance of state 
resource taxation militates against the producers' and utilities' posi-
tion. The producers and utilities requested that a factual determina-
tion be made to determine whether national policy was actually 
frustrated by the coal severance tax; however, the court stated that 
the scope and substance of national policy are matters of statutory 
interpretation which do not require the taking of testimony.10o As a 
result of its conclusions, the Montana Supreme Court affirmed the 
94. 615 P.2d 847 (Mont. 1980). 
95. [d. at 854-55. The Montana Supreme Court emphasized recent U.S. Supreme Court 
decisions as evidence of the trend to preserve resource production and extraction as fields for 
state taxation, stating: 
[A] seller State has various means of obtaining legitimate contribution to the cost of 
its government, without imposing a direct tax on interstate sales. While these per-
mitted taxes may in an ultimate sense come out of interstate commerce, they are not, 
as would be a tax on gross receipts, a direct imposition on that very freedom of com-
mercial flow which for more than 150 years has been the ward of the Commerce 
Clause. 
615 P.2d at 854-55 (Mont. 1980) (quoting Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 256 (1946». 
96. For a discussion of the Complete Auto Transit test, see supra note 68. 
97. 615 P.2d 847, 855 (Mont. 1980). 
98. [d. at 847. 
99. [d. at 861. 
100. [d. at 860. 
520 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:503 
lower court's dismissal based upon the failure of the producers and 
utilities to state a claim for which relief could be granted. lol 
2. The United States Supreme Court 
The Montana coal severance tax was upheld by the state courts; 
the producers and utilities, therefore, appealed to the United States 
Supreme Court. The Montana tax was upheld once more. 102 In the 
Supreme Court's judgment, the validity of the tax turned on the 
"operating incidence" of the tax - whether the state's power was 
exercised in proper proportion to the activities of the coal 
producers. lo3 In formulating its opinion, the Court renounced its 
earlier reasoning based on the Heisler trilogyl04 and instead de-
veloped the commerce clause analysis enunciated in Complete Auto 
Transit, Inc. v. Brady.lo5 Unlike the mechanical Heisler test, Com-
plete Auto Transit established a four-pronged balancing test which 
focuses on the practical effect of the challenged tax. In order for a 
state tax to be valid under the commerce clause, it must meet all four 
criteria: first, the tax must be applied to an activity with a substan-
tial nexus with the taxing state; second, the tax must be fairly appor-
tioned; third, the tax must not discriminate against interstate com-
merce; and fourth, the tax must be fairly related to services provided 
by the state.106 The Supreme Court concluded that the Montana coal 
severance tax satisfied all four prongs of the Complete Auto Transit 
test. 
The producers and utilities attacked the Montana tax under the 
third prong of the test by asserting that the tax is, in fact, 
discriminatory because the tax burden is borne primarily by out-of-
state utility consumers.107 In refuting this claim, the Court noted 
101. [d. The Montana Supreme Court supported its position by noting that: 
[W]e should be slow to strike down legislation which the state concededly had power 
to enact, because of its asserted burden on the federal government. For the state is 
powerless to remove the ill effects of our decision, while the national government, 
which has the ultimate power, remains free to remove the burden. 
615 P.2d at 860 (Mont. 1980) (quoting Pennsylvania Dairies v. Milk Control Comm'n, 318 U.S. 
261, 275 (1943». 
102. 453 U.S. 609-11 (1981). 
103. [d. at 625 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1964». 
104. [d. at 617. See supra notes 69-70. 
105. 453 U.S. 609, 614-16 (1981). 
106. [d.; Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). 
107. Appellants' Complaint 1 18, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 
(1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS. supra note 26, at 98. This argument was also advanced by 
the amici states in Heisler, where Pennsylvania shipped 80 percent of its anthracite coal out-
of-state and was charged with impermissibly burdening inl-('rstate commerce with a severance 
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that most commerce clause discrimination cases focus on the dif-
ferent tax treatment afforded interstate and intrastate commerce 
activities. Those cases are premise on the claim that state boundaries 
should be irrelevant to commercial transactions. lOS The Court noted 
that the Montana coal severance tax is levied on all coal extracted in 
the state, regardless of its interstate or intrastate destination, and 
the Court remarked that for it to "invalidate the Montana tax solely 
because most of Montana's coal is shipped across the very state 
borders that ordinarily are to be considered irrelevant would require 
a significant and, in our view, unwarranted departure from the ra-
tionale of our prior discrimination cases."109 Thus, according to the 
Court, the tax does not discriminate in a manner prohibited by the 
commerce clause. 
The producers and utilities also challenged the tax under the 
fourth prong of the Complete Auto Transit test which requires that 
the tax be fairly related to services provided by the state. The pro-
ducers' and utilities' position assumed that the tax was intended to 
reimburse the state for the cost of specific services; consequently, 
the state's power to tax is limited by the value of those services ac-
tually provided. The Court's perception of the issue was very dif-
ferent. no The Court reasoned that because the tax is measured as a 
percentage of the value of the coal taken from Montana, the tax is in 
proper proportion to the taxed activity in the state.11l The Montana 
tax. The Court then, as now, was reluctant to judge the validity of a state tax by assessing the 
exportation of the tax burden. 453 U.S. 609, 618 (1981). See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 24, Commonwealth v. Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted 
in LAW REPRINTS. supra note 26, at 736. 
108. 453 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1981). The Court stated "in matters of foreign and interstate 
commerce there are no state lines." Id. (quoting West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 
229, 255 (1911». 
109. 453 U.S. 609, 619 (1981). In addition, the Court rejected the use of the commerce 
clause as a "sword" to grant residents of one state a right of access at "reasonable" prices to 
resources located in another state irrespective of whether or on what terms the residents of 
the resource-rich states have access to those resources. See Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 25 n.16; Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), 
reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 737. The Court stated "[w]e are not convinced 
that the Commerce Clause, of its own force, gives the residents of one State the right to con-
trol in this fashion the terms of resource development and depletion in a sister State." 453 
U.S. 609, 619 (1981). Cf Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 626 (1978). 
110. 453 U.S. 609, 620-21 (1981). 
111. Id. at 626. The Court stated "[w]hen a tax is assessed in proportion to a taxpayer's ac-
tivities or presence in a state, the taxpayer is shouldering its fair share of supporting the 
State's provision of 'police and fire protection, the benefit of a trained work force, and the ad-
vantages of a civilized society.' " Id. at 627. See Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep't of Revenue, 
447 U.S. 207, 228 (1980) (quoting Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 
445 (1979». 
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tax was found to be fairly related to state-provided services solely 
because it is based on the quantity and quality of the coal extracted. 
The Court engaged in no factual inquiry into the fairness of the rela-
tionship between revenues generated and costs incurred. 
Concluding that the Montana tax satisfied the Complete Auto 
Transit test, the Supreme Court went on to discuss the practical ef-
fect of the tax. It stated unequivocally that "[t]here can be no ques-
tion that Montana may constitutionally raise general revenue by im-
posing a severance tax on coal mined in the state."112 The Court ex-
plained that the individual consumers in another state may 
legitimately be required to pay the tax even though they derive no 
direct gain from the tax revenues and they are not directly responsi-
ble for the costs incurred by coal development.11s The Court framed 
the controlling question to be whether the state has given anything 
for which it can ask recompense in return,114 and concluded that: 
[w]hen, as here, a general revenue tax does not discriminate 
against interstate commerce and is a:pportioned to activities oc-
curring within the State, the State IS free to pursue its own 
fiscal policies, unembarrassed by the Constitution, if by the prac-
tical operation of a tax the State has exerted its power in rela-
tion to opportunities which it has given, to protection which it 
has afforded, to benefits which it has conferred by the fact of be-
ing an orderly, civilized society.'1l5 
Because the Montana coal severance tax compensates the state for 
the depletion of its natural resource base as well as the provision of 
necessary public services it is a legitimate exercise of state power ac-
cording to the Court's opinion, regardless of who actually pays the 
tax. 
Addressing the supremacy clause issue, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the contention that the Montana tax was preempted by 
federal legislation and policy. The producers and utilities asserted 
that the state severance tax conflicts with the system of sharing 
federal receipts from mineral leases on public lands which was 
established by the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.116 The Court 
rejected that argument by noting Congress intended through the 
Act to provide a fair return to the public and not to retain all the 
112. 453 u.s. 609, 624 (1981). 
113. [d. at 622-23 (quoting Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 521-22 
(1937». 
114. [d. at 625. See General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436, 440-41 (1964); 
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940). 
115. [d. at 624-25 (quoting Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 444 (1940». 
116. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-209 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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revenues from the mineral leasing of federallands. u7 The Supreme 
Court then turned to the numerous federal statutes cited by the pro-
ducers and utilities to support their position that the Montana tax 
substantially frustrates national energy policy and, therefore, is 
preempted. us The Court found only one statute, the Powerplant and 
Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978,U9 to contain "specific statutory 
provisions favoring the use of coal."120 The Court further noted, 
however, that even this statute clearly contemplates the continued 
existence of state coal severance taxes. 121 As a result, the Court 
found no direct conflict between the Montana tax and any federal 
statute and upheld the tax against the supremacy clause challenges. 
Although the Montana coal severance tax was upheld by a majority 
of the Supreme Court, four justices were troubled by the outcome of 
the Commonwealth Edison case. Three justices dissented122 on the 
ground that a trial on the facts was necessary to determine ade-
quately the practical consequences of the tax - in particular, a 
judicial factfinding would show the extent to which interstate com-
merce may be unduly burdened. 123 Justice White, concurring in the 
majority's decision, nevertheless expressed considerable doubt about 
the case's result and concluded that "the better part of both wisdom 
and valor is to respect the judgment of the other branches of the 
government," and wait for Congress to act.124 This combination of 
opinions indicates that the decision in Commonwealth Edison does 
not represent overwhelming judicial approval of current state taxa-
tion of energy resources. 
The majority of the Court itself questioned the judiciary's ability to 
resolve successfully the immense and intricate problems of state tax-
ation and national economic and energy policies. Justice Marshall in 
the majority opinion expressed the reservation that "it is doubtful 
whether any legal test could adequately reflect the numerous and 
competing economic, geographic, demographic, social, and political 
117. ld. at 632. The House Report on the 1975 Amendments speaks only in terms of a con-
gressional intent to secure a "fair return to the public." H. REP. No. 681, 94th Congo 2d Sess., 
17-18, reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1943,1953. 
118. See infra text and notes at notes 230-238. 
119. 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. III 1979). 
120. 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981). 
121. ld. at 636. 
122. Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens dissented. ld. at 638-53. 
123. ld. at 651-53. 
124. ld. at 637, 638 (White, J., concurring). Justice White's concurring opinion was made 
"with the realization that Montana's levy on consumers in other States may in the long run 
prove to be an intolerable and unacceptable burden on commerce." ld. 
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considerations that must inform a decision about an acceptable rate 
or level of state taxation."125 The Court resolved the problem in an 
inconclusory manner by leaving the decision with the state 
legislatures except where particular state taxes are thought to be 
contrary to federal interests. In such cases, Congress should deter-
mine the appropriate tax rate.126 Obviously, the Court's opinion 
leaves some fundamental questions unanswered. Who decides when 
the level of a state's tax becomes unacceptable? When do the federal 
interests in a national energy policy outweigh the state's prerogative 
to tax activity within its borders? The next section will address these 
questions by focusing on the proper legislative forum in which to 
fashion an equitable tax on coal development. 
III. THE PROPER LEGISLATIVE FORUM 
Federal-state tensions are inherent in our constitutional federal-
ism; each state's political autonomy is subject to the national good.127 
The economic interdependency of every state heightens the tension. 
The taxation of energy resources illustrates well the difficulty of ac-
commodating the states' needs and wants with the nation's economic 
stability. While the federal government seeks to develop abundant, 
low-cost energy supplies,128 the energy-producing states demand 
reimbursement for production costs129 and the energy-importing 
states balk at paying those costs.1SO Any state legislative forum must 
consider and meet the needs of its constituency. The federal 
legislative forum must develop and implement a coherent national 
policy to manage energy resource production. Both federal and state 
legislative bodies must balance their competing interests to develop 
equitable responses attuned to the marketplace where the economic 
consequences of such decisionmaking are evidenced. The federal 
legislative forum has had difficulty implementing a cohesive energy 
policy, while the state legislative bodies, fully cognizant of the costs 
of energy production and consumption, have acted on their own. 
While the taxation of energy production is properly within the pur-
view of state legislatures, it remains to be seen what concerns and 
constraints must be taken into account in order to fashion an 
equitable resource tax system. 
125. Id. at 628. 
126. Id. 
127. See supra notes 17-18. 
128. See infra text at notes 232-35. 
129. See supra text at notes 6-9; infra text at notes 148-84. 
130. See supra text at notes 15, 53-65. 
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A. The State Forum 
The state legislature's power to tax is a necessary corollary to its 
ability to make laws; that power to tax is indispensable to the state's 
continued existence.13l The state's sovereign power to tax, however, 
is necessarily limited within the confines of the United States Con-
stitution.132 Constitutional challenges of state taxing power are most 
frequently based on the commerce clause or the due process clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 133 Commerce clause constraints on 
state taxation exist only when state taxing schemes substantially 
burden interstate commerce.134 Due process limitations may be im-
posed if the statute favors intrastate business over interstate 
business.135 Even if a state tax is within these constitutional 
parameters, it may still be restricted by specific congressional action 
taken pursuant to its plenary commerce clause powers. 
In the case of Montana, the state legislature responded to the coal 
boom of the early 1970's by enacting a tax mechanism designed to 
pay the costs of administering mining and reclamation laws while 
providing revenues to mitigate the social and environmental impacts 
of massive coal production.136 Montana in particular is cognizant of 
the "rip, profit, and run" practices of some natural resource 
developers.137 In the early 1900's, Montana saw 46 million tons of 
copper severed from its land by a large out-of-state corporation, 
Anaconda Copper;138 it saw the city of Butte boom to a pre-World 
131. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,10 (1824). Alexander Hamilton developed this 
position in the Federalist Papers by stating: 
[T]he individual states should possess an independent and uncontrollable authority to 
raise their own revenues for the supply of their own wants. And making this conces-
sion, I affirm that ... they would, under the plan of the convention, retain that 
authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the part 
of the national government to abridge them in exercise of it, would be a violent 
assumption of power, unwarranted by any article or clause of its constitution. 
THE FEDERALIST No. 32, at 61 (A. Hamilton) (A. Hacker, ed., 1964). 
132. The Supreme Court found that the power to tax is the power to destroy. M'Culloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415, 433 (1819). As a result, the state's power to tax must be ex-
ercised within the constitutional limits which allow that power. 
133. See Parnell, supra note 30. 
134. See infra text at notes 210-22. 
135. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
136. See infra text at notes 148-84. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, 
supra note 6, at 76 (statement of Mont. Att'y Gen. Mike Greely). 
137. See Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 97 (state-
ment of Marjorie Harper, President, Clark Fork Basin Protective Ass'n). 
138. Nat'l Tax Ass'n - Tax Inst. of America, Proceedings of the 72nd Annual Conference, 
Louisiana's First Use Tax (presentation of Rep. Billy Tauzin, Chairman, Louisiana House 
Natural Resources Committee) 194, 197 (1979); Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 
100 (citing National Journal, Mar. 22, 1980). 
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War I population of over 100,000 and bust to a dwindling population 
of less than 25,000;139 it saw the open-pit mines grow, encircle the 
city, and scar the terrain;140 and perhaps worst of all, it saw the out-
of-state lobbying interests control its legislative process.141 The 
developers were the largest employers in the state and they owned 
every sizable daily newspaper .142 Left with an environmental and 
social disaster from that copper development, Montana is acutely 
aware of the potential costs of coal development. 
The western states' Northern Great Plains environment is com-
prised of a composite of social, cultural, and physical factors. The 
current national demand for coal necessitates a transformation of 
that environment, subsuming it into energy and economic concerns. 
The resulting sensation of being a colony subject to manipulation by 
outside forces is prevalent in the region;143 perhaps this attitude is 
due in part to the realization that sparse populations144 may provide 
less opposition to the sacrifice of their land.145 The transiency of the 
139. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 340 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe); Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 151. 
140. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 592 (statement of David Alberswerth, 
Western Organization of Resource Councils). 
141. One Montana state official stated, "You could see the Anaconda lobbyists in the 
Legislature and, honest to God, when votes were taken, they would nod for a yes vote and 
shake their heads for a no vote." Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 109 (citing Min-
neapolis Star, June 10, 1980). 
142. Id. In addition, the wealthy copper kings did not bestow their largesse on Montana in-
stitutions, but rather preferred to benefit corporate headquarters and bankers in New York 
City, the Corcoran Art Gallery in Washington, D.C., the University of Virginia, and Stanford 
University. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 340 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe); Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 151 (statement of Mont. State 
Sen. Thomas E. Towe). 
143. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 58 (statement 
of N.D. Att'y Gen. Allen I. Olson); Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 98 (statement 
of N.D. U.S. Rep. Byron L. Dorgan). The western coal-producing states "have shown that they 
are willing to allow strip-mining to help supply energy to the rest of America. But, we are 
determined that we will not be made a national sacrifice area in order to heat Minneapolis and 
air condition Detroit. We are determined that we will not allow the development of this energy 
without requiring this development to pay its own way. We do not have large industrial tax 
bases to pick up any slack, and we simply are not going to allow the costs to fallon our farmers, 
workers, small business people, or on future generations." Id. 
144. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL 
ABSTRACTS OF THE UNITED STATES (100th ed. 1979) (stating that Montana has a population of 
785,000 and 147,138 square miles, Wyoming contains a population of 424,000 and 97,914 
square miles, and North Dakota has a population of 652,000 and 70,048 square miles), cited in 
Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 129 (App., paper of 
Prof. Daniel H. Henning). 
145. Marjorie Harper, President of the Clark Fork Basin Protective Association expressed 
her fears that "[w]ith a government that functions on the principle of the greatest good for the 
many, a sparsely populated area like Montana can easily become a sacrifice area." Federal 
Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 97. 
1982] COMMONWEALTH EDISON 527 
"boom" cycle also points to the exploitative nature of the develop-
ment of coal which, if not carefully controlled, will leave behind a 
lunar landscape and local government debts reaching far into the 
future. 146 Therefore, the decision by western coal-producing states 
to impose coal severance taxes is based on the equitable notion that 
those who benefit from power generated by the combustion of 
western coal reserves must assume a small portion of the cost of pro-
viding those fuel reserves.147 
1. Examining the Costs of Coal Development 
Increased resource extraction results in three types of costs to 
state government:148 the ordinary costs of providing public services; 
the extraordinary costs of enduring environmental injury; and the 
future costs of losing non-renewable resources. The costs associated 
with coal development are considered particularly onerous due to the 
massive disruption of the terrain caused by strip-mining and the ex-
pensive transportation problems of moving coal.149 The western 
state legislatures, confronted with these costs at every session, must 
decide how best to meet the needs presented to them. The following 
sections will outline the costs which must be met by either state or 
local government treasuries. 
a. Ordinary Costs 
Ordinary costs associated with coal production include community 
impact problems and services required due to industrial develop-
ment, environmental monitoring, and highway construction. Rapid 
population increases occasioned by industrial manpower needs 
create huge increases in the demand for public services, requiring 
significant150 and immediate151 capital expenditures by local govern-
ment. In an attempt to estimate the likely impact costs to the 
146. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 341 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). 
147. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 17 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. Alan K. 
Simpson). 
148. Peters, An Outline for Development of Cost-Based State Severance Taxes, 20 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 913, 922-926 (1980); Link, Political Constraint and North Dakota's Coal 
Severance Tax, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 263, 265 (1978). 
149. See infra note 155. 
150. Local costs are significant not only in terms of services and facilities required but in 
terms of the premium paid for the money to provide those services and facilities as well. In 
rapidly growing communities whose fortunes are uncertain, the usual 20-year amortization 
period is reduced to 3 to 5 year repayment periods. ClYmmeTce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, 
at 152 (statement of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe); Coal Severance Tax Hearings, supra 
note 1, at 148 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Rep. Dick Cheney). 
151. Most major coal deposits lie in areas where local government has little or no excess 
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western coal producing states, the Congressional Budget Office con-
cluded that local governments could reasonably anticipate spending 
$7,122 for capital investments and an additional $1,714 in operating 
costs for each new person entering a coal development area. 152 
Assuming conservative population increases, the resulting fiscal 
outlays required of affected local governments are enormous - $85 
million in capital investments and $20 million in operating costS. 153 
To a rural community, a population increase of only 1,000 people 
has a significant effect. To accommodate those 1,000 additional resi-
dents, the local government must provide 100,000 more gallons of 
water per day and a place to store it; an additional 2 miles of sewer 
lines; $175,000 worth of sewer treatment facilities; 6 miles of 
streets; $100,000 worth of signs; 102 street lights; 4.8 acres of parks; 
one-third of a garbage truck; one-sixth of a fire truck; 1.8 policemen; 
1.5 firemen; 6.5 miscellaneous employees; 4.8 elementary class-
rooms; and 3.6 high school classrooms.154 Funding must also be pro-
vided to maintain everything in operating order. The strains caused 
by the dramatic population increases in rural coal-producing areas 
are apparent. 
A second ordinary cost borne by those states faced with potentially 
massive coal development is that of environmental protection. En-
capacity to deliver increased services. It takes up to 3 years to ready a coal mine for operation 
and in the meantime local residents face the prospect of either watching the quality of their ex-
isting services decline or seeing the burden of local taxes rise. See Coal Severance Tax Hear-
ing. supra note 1, at 341 (statement of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe); STATE TAXATION OF 
MINERAL DEPOSITS AND PRODUCTION, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
DIVISION 2, 14-15 (1978) [hereinafter cited as STATE TAXATION]. 
This so-called "front-end financing problem" has been innovatively addressed by the state 
legislatures of Montana, Wyoming, and Utah. With the creation of a Coal Board to administer 
impact assistance, Montana provides direct local aid by requiring new developments with a 
major impact on existing public services to prepay, on request, an amount up to three times the 
estimated property tax due on the completed facility. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 15-16-201 (1981». 
Wyoming authorized the issuance of revenue bonds to finance a state Community Develop-
ment Authority which can loan funds to both private and public sector institutions. WYo. STAT. 
§ 9-18-101-123 (1977 & Supp. 1981). Utah enacted a program centered on the prepayment of 
sales and use taxes on the equipment and machinery used in the development and production 
of resources. However, because the legislature must approve the projects to receive funding, 
the efficient and timely distribution of monies is uncertain. UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-51-5-71 
(1981). See STATE TAXATION, supra note 151, at 14-19. 
152. See Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 342 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe) (citing CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE REPORT: ENERGY DEVELOPMENT, 
LOCAL GROWTH AND THE FEDERAL ROLE). 
153. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 46 (statement 
of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe). These figures assume coal industry employment needs 
will increase each impacted community's population from 4,000 to 12,000 people. See id. 
154. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 141 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. 
Malcolm Wallop). 
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vironmental monitoring is essential to any industrial development, 
but none more so than strip-mining activities. 155 The administrative 
burden on the state in reviewing and granting mining permits, 
reviewing mining plans, reviewing and approving reclamation plans, 
inspecting the mines, and generally monitoring conformance with 
the state environmental protection laws is considerable. 156 Since 
most of the coal reserves in the western states are surface mined, the 
states face unavoidable costs to ensure adequate environmental 
safeguards. 
The third ordinary cost resulting from increased coal production is 
highway construction, perhaps the largest single investment re-
quired of the state government's treasury.157 In Montana, over 300 
miles of identified roads158 comprising eleven routes service existing 
coal mines and the towns which house their workers. These roads are 
dirt, gravel, or lightly paved. 159 Enormous capital outlays are needed 
to upgrade or reconstruct the present system to meet the heavier 
standards required to transport coal. The deterioration of existing 
highway systems and the demand for new construction are caused 
by current and anticipated increases in western coal traffic - the 97 
million tons per year transported in 1975 is expected to swell to 307 
million tons in 1985 and to reach 625 million tons per year by 1990.160 
Montana estimates it will need $64 million to provide adequate roads 
to accommodate this increased coal production. 161 
b. Extraordinary Costs 
Extraordinary costs associated with the development of coal in the 
western states include risks to the unique western environment and 
alteration of a special social fabric. The phrase "the West" evokes a 
vision of frontier expanses and pioneering peoples, evidencing a 
155. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 103 (statement of N.D. U.S. Rep. Byron 
L. Dorgan); id. at 159 (statement of James C. Rosapepe, Multistate Tax Comm'n). 
156. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 340 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). 
157. Id. at 329 (statement of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe). 
158. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 93 (statement 
of Roger Tippy, Mont. Att'y). 
159. Id. 
160. Coal: Transportation Hangups Cause Headaches as Industry Tries to Increase Exports 
[1980] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 376:21. 
161. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 152 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). Most studies, including those of the Congressional Budget Office and Na-
tional Economic Research Associates (hired by the utilities to support their position to limit 
state tax rates), fail to account for road costs. While Montana has identified $64 million in road 
work required by impacted areas, it has allocated only $15 million for this purpose to date. Id. 
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special American heritage. The West is an undeveloped and sparsely 
populated land. Among its physical assets are clear skies, untram-
meled terrain, and few people. The hope of retaining that western 
heritage is dimmed by the fact that the region holds one of the 
world's largest and richest coal deposits, containing an estimated 75 
billion tons of relatively clean, easily-mined coal.162 
The western states are surrendering their huge coal seams, 100 
feet thick and lying under only 25 to 50 feet of earth. With shovels 
able to remove 100 tons of earth in a single SCOOp,163 western lands 
are being irreversibly altered.164 In an effort to address these prob-
lems reclamation of all strip-mined land is required by both federal 
and state statutes.166 The topsoil is preserved during the mining ac-
tivities and later the land is regraded and planted. 166 Nevertheless, 
even with considerable sums of money expended to reclaim the 
land,167 the terrain is changed, the plantlife is altered, the native 
wildlife is displaced and may not return, and the ground water may 
be degraded. 16s The soil and the plant and animal communities de-
162. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 108 (citing Minneapolis Star, June 10, 
1980). 
163. Id. 
164. In Colstrip, Montana, the strip mining of 78.8 million tons of coal has "disturbed" over 
3,200 acres of land - 5 square miles - half of which has begun to be reclaimed. WESTERN 
ENERGY COMPANY, COLSTRIP FACT SHEET 3 (1981). If the synfuels industry develops to levels of 
production of 15 million barrels of oil a day as projected by C.C. Garvin, Jr., Chairman of Ex· 
xon, Corp., 15 strip mines would be required - each 3 miles long and 1112 miles wide. Water 
would be required as well - 30 to 45 million barrels per day. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, 
supra note 1, at 102 (citing National Journal, March 22, 1980). 
165. The Montana Strip and Underground Reclamation Act, MONT. CODE ANN., 
§§ 82·4-201-254 (1981), and the Federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 
30 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1309 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
166. THE WESTERN ENERGY COMPANY, COLSTRIP FACT SHEET 3 (1981) describes the reclama-
tion process as follows: 
Id. 
Following mining, reclamation begins with regrading disturbed land to its approx-
imate original contour. Drainages are reconstructed and the surface recont .JUred to 
minimize erosion and maximize benefits from precipitation. The main objective of the 
reclamation program is to restore disturbed lands to a permanent, diverse vegetative 
cover of predominantly native plant species suitable for livestock grazing and wildlife 
habitat .... The present revegetation strategy involves a two-phase seeding se-
quence. In the first phase, selected forbs, shrubs and warm season grasses are broad-
cast seeded and allowed to develop for at least one growing season. The seeond phase 
consists of drill seeding a permanent cool season perennial grass mixture. The use of 
two-phased seeding avoids the deleterious competition between different plant life 
forms and promotes plant community diversity. 
167. The reclamation bonds required of coal producers cost between $4,000 to $6,000 per 
acre. Conversation with Bill Schwarzkoph, Reclamation Supervisor, Western Energy Com-
pany, Jan. 8, 1982. The cost of reclamation, primarily for regrading, ranges from $16,000 to 
$23,000 per acre. WESTERN ENERGY COMPANY, COLSTRIP FACT SHEET 4 (1981). 
168. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 425-26 (statement of Sally Hunt 
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pendent on it took centuries to develop; the renewal of balanced com-
munities necessary for total reclamation will take hundreds of years 
in the arid West. 169 In addition, coal serves as a water-coursel70 and 
the mining of coal disturbs existing aquifers vital to any agricultural 
use of western lands. l71 These extraordinary environmental costs oc-
casioned by the mining of coal are certainly not minimal to the coal-
producing state. 
The changes worked into the social fiber of the western rural com-
munities are equally permanentY2 Small close-knit towns must ex-
pand to house, feed, entertain, and support thousands of transient 
residents. Facilities necessary to accommodate the needs of a young 
work force, such as recreational centers and day care services, are 
usually nonexistent. l73 Increased crime, greater familial problems, 
and alcoholism are not uncommon in these impact areasY4 Called 
upon to meet the demands of an ever-increasing population after 
years of static or declining numbers, the local governments in these 
coal-rich areas are straining every facility and every public 
serviceY5 The social and cultural changes occasioned by increased 
coal development is an extraordinary cost which, although difficult 
to quantify, is no less significant. 
c. Future Costs 
The future costs associated with the development of coal include 
reclamation of the mined areas and preservation of the economic 
Streiter, Nat'l Economic Research Associates, Inc.). 
169. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 341 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). 
170. A water-course is a bed or channel for water. See Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra 
note 1, at 424 (statement of Sally Hunt Streiter, Nat'l Economic Research Associates, Inc.). 
171. [d. 
172. Helen Waller, Chairwoman of the Northern Great Plains Resource Council, noted the 
intra-community disagreement over resource development in rural western towns, and 
remarked "even though there has been no coal extracted, we have already been impacted and 
no money is going to ever, you know, quite bring our community back to what it was .... " 
Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 41. 
173. Dr. J. Uhlman of the Denver Research Institute, and former Director of the Wyoming 
Human Service Project, surveyed 40 separate energy communities and found, in pertinent 
part: 
70% had no mental health facilities; 
52% had no alcoholism counseling; 
47% had no movie theatre; and 
most had no family planning services. 
Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 341 (statement of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. 
Towe). 
174. [d. at 332. 
175. Helen Waller, Chairwoman of the Northern Great Plains Resource Council, discussed 
the effects of development on local schools: 
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base of the state. Strip-mined land requires long-term reclamation 
and maintenance efforts to erase the damage done by development.176 
Although bonds required by the Surface Mining Control and Recla-
mation Act of 1977177 have been posted, fears exist of unforeseen 
and undetected problems which may not be adequately corrected 
through reclamation funds alone. The western coal-producing states 
point to the unaddressed issues of mining-related health problems 
and land surface subsidence which currently exist in Appalachian 
coal areas. 178 Convinced that there will be major future costs as yet 
unknown, the western states are placing a portion of coal severance 
tax revenues into inviolate trusts designed to meet those contingen-
cies. 179 
In addition, the extraction of nonrenewable resources represents a 
depletion of the state's economic base. 18o It is a one-time harvest.181 
The mining of coal will continue only as long as it is profitable to do 
so. Once western coal's marketability declines, the coal producers 
will disappear and the "boom" will quickly become "bust." The 
future costs of decay in abandoned urban areas and of loeal govern-
ment debt are uncertain and troubling. 
State and local governments must pay for the staggering costs 
associated with coal development. These costs are not adequately 
met through traditional state revenue sources, even when combined 
with federal impact aid. No property tax revenues are received from 
the large areas of federal lands.182 In addition, Congress' spending 
habits do not provide a reliable source of assistance to the states. 
Now I realize that the impact money helps to pay for the construction of a building, 
although the local people still pick up part of the tab, but even so, the physical 
building is a small part of the kids' education. One for-instance that I know of, and I'm 
sure you've heard this one before, is the fact in Colstrip, in one year, one particular 
child I know had eight teachers. Now that's a cost that that child is paying that no 
amount of dollars will ever make up for. 
Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 41. 
176. See supra note 166. 
177. 30 U.S.C. § 1259 (Supp. III 1979). See Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 
670. 
178. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 341 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). 
179. Under the terms of a 1976 amendment to the Montana Constitution, after December 
31, 1979, at least 50 percent of the revenues generated by the coal severance tax must be paid 
into a permanent trust fund, the principal of which may be appropriated only by a vote of 
three-fourths of the members of each house of the state legislature. MONT. COKST. art. IX, § 5 
(1981). The legislature may allocate the interest from the trust fund as it sees fit. Id. 
180. Commonwealth Edison Company v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 624 (1981). 
181. Peters, supra note 148, at 925; Link, supra note 148, at 264-65. 
182. It has been a long-established principle of constitutional federalism that states may not 
tax the federal government. M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 415 (1819). 
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Congress recently enacted three impact aid bills intended to mitigate 
local costs - the legislation was never funded. 183 The western states 
are forced to pay most of the increased costs of coal development by 
themselves and, even with large tax receipts, some states are expect-
ing revenue shortfalls. 184 
2. Choosing a Severance Tax 
Thirty-three states185 have thus far concluded that the costs 
associated with natural resource development cannot be handled by 
conventional taxes alone. 186 Instead, an industry-specific tax - a 
severance tax - is required to meet those costs. A severance tax is a 
payment for the privilege of severing natural resources from the soil 
or water .187 It is measured by the market value or quantity of the 
resource removed or sold188 and is usually imposed on energy-related 
products. 189 
Severance taxes on energy resources have come under national 
scrutiny due to the sharp increase in state revenues generated by 
183. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 30 (statement of Wyo. U.S. Sen. Alan K. 
Simpson). 
184. Although the receipts from energy resource production taxes are considerable, the 
costs which attend development are also significant. North Dakota is projecting a shortfall of 
$10 million based on a North Dakota Regional Environmental Assessment Program Study, 
and Wyoming has identified a $27 million shortfall based on an Old West Regional Commission 
Report. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 341 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). 
185. These states are: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Florida, Idaho, In· 
diana, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, 
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, 
Oklahama, Oregon, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, 
and Wyoming. See Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 114 (statement of Shirley 
Kallek, Bureau of the Census); [1981]2 STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH)" 45-200 to 45-955. 
186. Mineral property was first taxed by an ad valorem property tax which is based on a 
mine's assessed value and the local millage rate. This tax is levied whether the mineral deposit 
is being worked or not, and is found in use in Pennsylvania and Illinois. STATE TAXATION, supra 
note 151, at 3. 
187. A privilege tax is an excise tax, and as such is not subject to constitutional restrictions 
applicable to property taxes such as millage limits and uniformity provisions. An excise tax 
and a property tax can be imposed concurrently and are not considered to be an unacceptable 
double tax. STATE TAXATION, supra note 151, at 6. 
188. [1980] STATE TAX GUIDE (CCH), 45-000; Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 
110 (statement of Shirley Kallek, Bureau of the Census). 
189. Approximately 90 percent of all severance taxes is derived from energy-related prod-
ucts; the remaining 10 percent is generated by taxes on timber and such minerals as copper, 
potash, sand and gravel. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 110 (statement of 
Shirley Kallek, Bureau of the Census). Nevertheless, the non-energy resource tax revenues 
are significant. In 1979, Minnesota, which filed an amici brief in the Commonwealth Edison 
case against Montana's coal severance tax, received more money from its 15 percent 
severance tax on iron ores than Montana did from its coal severance tax. Coal Severance Tax 
---------------
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these taxes - a 44 percent increase between fiscal years 1979 and 
1980 alone, with receipts growing from $2.9 billion to $4.2 billion in 
that year alone.19o Of the thirty-three states with severance taxes, 
eight states accounted for 86.6 percent of the national total of $4.2 
billion received in 1980.191 These states are Texas, Alaska, Loui-
siana, Oklahoma, New Mexico, Kentucky, Florida, and Wyoming.192 
The fourteen states which impose a coal severance tax193 play a 
relatively modest role in the nation's energy market when compared 
to state revenues from oil and gas severance taxes. 194 
Each state has developed its own unique system of taxation, with 
interactions between types of taxes so complex that any generalized 
statements about energy resource taxes are not helpful. 195 Texas' oil 
Hearing, supra note 1, at 88 (citing Energy: Limiting State Coal Severance Taxes Report by 
the Congressional Research Service (1980». 
190. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 109 (statement of Shirley Kallek, Bureau 
of the Census). 
191. [d. 
192. [d. Montana, with a 30% coal severance tax, is not included among the top 
moneymakers. It is interesting to note that Texas, which filed an amici brief in the Com-
monwealth Edison case against Montana's coal severance tax, took in considerably more in 
severance tax revenues than any other state. In 1980, Texas received $1.525 billion while the 
second-ranked severance tax state, Louisiana, took in "only" $525 million. [d. 
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194. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 159 (statement of James Rosapepe, Rep., 
Multistate Tax Comm'n). 
195. There are states which levy a tax on coal production which is not denominated a 
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and gas resources generate incredible revenues - enough for its 
legislature to consider eliminating all property taxes to complete the 
state's position of no income or sales taxes. 196 Louisiana currently 
uses its oil and gas revenues to offset property taxes. 197 Other states, 
such as Montana, have chosen to place a portion of their severance 
tax revenues into trust funds in order to reduce the inevitable loss of 
economic advantage once the nonrenewable resource base is 
depleted.198 Moreover, some states raise revenues from mining ac-
tivities but do not classify the levy as a severance tax per se. This oc-
curs when the taxes take the form of a general sales tax covering 
items in addition to mined resources. West Virginia, as an example, 
levies an occupational gross income tax on the proceeds from the sale 
severance tax. See Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 108 (statement of Shirley 
Kallek, Bureau of the Census). In addition, the severance tax is just one part of an overall tax 
burden. In North Dakota, for example, a deduction for federal income taxes is provided from 
the state corporate income tax. Each state has its own unique system. Commerce Clause Hear-
ings, supra note 9, at 102 (statement of N.D. U.S. Rep. Byron L. Dorgan). 
A comparison of Montana and Wyoming coal severance taxes illustrates well the in-
dividualized nature of each state's tax system. 
Montana Wyoming 
a) F.O.B. Mine Price 5.00 5.00 
b) Less Processing Costs 4.25 
c) Assessed Value 5.00 5.10 
d) Severance (excise) taxes 1.50 .535 
e) Gross proceeds (ad valorem) taxes .225 .316 
f) Indemnity Trust Fund .025 
Total Taxes 1.75 .85 
g) Gross Price F.O.B. Mine 6.75 5.85 
Total Taxes as % F.O.B. Mine Price 35% 17% 
a) F.O.B. Mine Price = the assumed price of the coal prior to taxes or deductions. 
b) Processing Costs = Wyoming deducts all crushing, screening, loading, etc. 
Estimated average deduction is .75 per ton (W.S. 39-2-202). 
c) Assessed Value = Wyoming uses a pyramid tax (tax on tax) (W.S. 39-2-202). 
d) Severance Taxes = Montana at 30% (Mont. Code Ann. 15-35-101) 
Wyoming at 10.5% (W.S. 39-6-202 and 39-6-303). 
e) Gross Proceeds Taxes = Montana at mill levy x 45% value 
Wyoming at mill levy x assessed value. 
f) Indemnity Trust Fund = Montana at .5% 
g) Gross Price F.O.B. Mine = the price including taxes - what the customer pays. 
MONTANA COAL COUNCIL REPORT. supra note 43, at Exhibit G. 
196. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 107 (citing Minneapolis Star, May 12, 
1980). 
197. In addition, Louisiana's Gov. Treen proposed to reduce income taxes by 36% and pay 
cash instead of borrowing for capital construction. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, 
at 106 (citing Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1980). 
198. See supra note 179. Alaska's Permanent Fund is the most sensational. (ALASKA CONST. 
art. IX, § 15). Using interest monies from the Fund, a recently enacted program distributes an 
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of coal; yet, the tax is not classified as a coal severance tax.199 These 
states have all chosen different means to generate revenues 
necessary to pay the costs of resource development. 
The most common resource tax measures include a true severance 
tax, a gross production severance tax, and a net production 
severance tax.200 A "true" severance tax is not tied to the value of 
the resource mined, but rather is measured according to a rate 
schedule based on the mine's production.201 Some state legislatures 
have linked the rate schedule to a price index, automatically ad-
justing the tax for the effects of inflation.202 The gross production 
severance tax is levied on a measure of the dollar value of the 
resource extracted.203 This tax is designed to compensate for rapid 
price changes and to account for production of different quality 
minerals. The disadvantages of this type of severance tax include 
financial problems resulting from possible periods of depressed 
prices and administrative difficulties in determining value for those 
mines where the output is not sold on the market, but is burned at 
the mouth of the mine.204 The net production severance tax allows 
producers to deduct particular expenses from their gross revenues 
before being subject to taxation.205 While this type of tax increases 
the administrative burden by requiring verification of claimed ex-
penses and may decrease revenues because the mine may not 
operate at a profit for several years, it is more accurate in reflecting 
the producer's true ability to pay the tax. Thus, each form of 
severance tax is different in its ease of administration and the ade-
quacy of the revenues it generates. 
Despite their differences in form, coal severance taxes are all 
enacted to compensate the state for the exceptional costs incurred to 
support a burgeoning coal industry.206 Each state's tax system 
reflects the state legislature's assessment of its revenue needs. The 
annual dividend to each adult of $1,000. It was the state legislature's determination that a 
disbursement of surplus revenues directly to residents would lessen the wastefulness of in-
evitable government spending. See Williams v. Zobel, 619 P.2d 448,453 (Alaska 1980); Coal 
Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 111 (citing New York Times, June 15, 1980). 
199. W. VA. CODE § 11-13-2a (1974 & Supp. 1981). 
200. STATE TAXATION, supra note 151, at 1-13. 
201. Id. at 7. 
202. Id. at 9. See the North Dakota Coal Severance Tax, N.D. CENT. CODE § 57-61-01 (1981). 
203. STATE TAXATION, supra note 151, at 9. 
204. Id. at 10. Some coal mines are vertically integrated with the electric utilities: the utility 
produces the coal itself and then burns it in a generating plant located at the mouth of the 
mine. See infra, text at notes 277-91. 
205. STATE TAXATION, supra note 151, at 12. 
206. See supra text at notes 148-84. 
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state legislature is well-suited to appraise the public services actually 
provided, to hear competing arguments, and to decide whether a 
severance tax is an appropriate measure for that state. The 
autonomy of each state to tax its own coal producers is necessary to 
maintain the balanced federalism created by the Constitution.207 
Under the assumption that, in a pluralistic society, decisions made at 
the state level are more responsive to local wishes and are therefore 
better than centralized decisionmaking,208 the state legislature is 
more cognizant of the costs necessary to provide the services re-
quired by increased coal development. The state legislature is more 
responsive to the desires of its constituents to control and manage 
the accompanying economic growth and it is more attuned to the 
responses of the competitive marketplace to prices reflecting state 
taxes.209 For all these reasons, the state is the most appropriate enti-
ty to formulate a response to the difficult problems presented by in-
creased coal production. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that Congress may override state tax 
policies with its commerce clause authority. 210 Congressional in-
terference with those state tax determinations would be warranted, 
however, only if the state action prohibited the flow of resources to 
out-of-state markets.211 In addition to the strong position of the state 
legislature to tax the coal industry, federal involvement in coal 
severance taxation is especially inadvisable in light of congressional 
reticence to formulate a definitive coal policy and its ineffective at-
tempts to regulate the coal industry. The following section will ad-
dress the present federal role in western coal production. 
B. The Federal Forum 
The Constitution grants to Congress the power to "regulate com-
merce ... among the several states."212 That power has been inter-
preted to be complete,213 but the commerce clause does not directly 
address the possibility of state interference with national commerce. 
207. See supra text at notes 131-35. 
208. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies, supra note 6, at 98-99. 
209. See Link, supra note 148, at 265-67. 
210. See supra note 17; infra, text at notes 212-22. 
211. 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981). 
212. The commerce clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
213. The plenary power of Congress over national commerce was declared by Chief Justice 
Marshall in his decision of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), where he described 
the federal power to regulate commerce as "complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost 
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the Constitution." Id. at 
9. 
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This silence creates ambiguity - is the commerce clause a device to 
balance the state and federal interests in national commerce or is it a 
means to establish the preeminence of national free trade? 
An historical perspective does not provide a resolution of this am-
biguity. The Constitutional Convention, divided between advocates 
of a strong central government and proponents of state sovereignty, 
refused to impose a categorical limitation on state action through the 
commerce clause.2l4 Shortly thereafter, a strong federalist inter-
pretation of the commerce clause was developed by Chief Justice 
Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.2l5 The decision, which found a state 
charter in conflict with a federal coastal licensing law, established 
the federal government's absolute power over interstate commerce. 
This opinion, although strongly federalist, did not completely negate 
the states' role in regulating commercial activities. The Supreme 
Court continued to grapple with the tension present in the commerce 
clause's silence regarding state interference with commerce and 
fashioned various tests to evalute state actions: whether the regula-
tion affected national or local subjects;2l6 whether it was a regulation 
of commerce or an exercise of the police power;2l7 or whether the 
regulation entailed a direct, substantial or an indirect, incidental 
burden on commerce.2lB As recently as 1980, the Supreme Court was 
still sharply divided on where federal powers under the commerce 
clause begin and end. In the case of Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,2l9 Justice 
Blackmun's majority opinion called for restraint in interfering with 
state regulation of commercial activities based on "consideration of 
state sovereignty [and] the role of each state 'as guardian and 
trustee for its people' ".220 Conversely, Justice Powell in his dissent 
took the position that "the Commerce Clause long has been recog-
214. See Browde & DuMars, supra note 17, at 13, n.30. 
215. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
216. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 319 (1851) (upholding a state re-
quirement that only local pilots navigate the Philadelphia harbor). 
217. U.S. v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895), where the Court stressed it was "vital that 
the independence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the delimitation be-
tween them, however sometimes perplexing, should always be recognized and observed, for 
while the one furnishes the strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation 
of the automony of the states as required by our dual form of government . . .". Id. at 13. 
218. Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876), which stated, "[U]ntil Congress acts in reference 
to their interstate relations, the State may exercise all the powers of government over them, 
even though in doing so it may indirectly operate upon commerce outside its immediate 
jurisdiction." Id. at 135. 
219. 147 U.S. 429 (1980) (upholding a state plan which limited sale of cement produced by 
the state's plant only to residents of the state). 
220. Id. at 438. 
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nized as a limitation on [state] sovereignty, consciously designed to 
maintain a national market and defeat economic provincialism."221 
Thus, a precise delineation of state and federal powers under the 
commerce clause is still not possible in all possible circumstances in 
which a state-federal conflict may arise. 
From the Court decisions rendered over the years, the conclusion 
arises that Congress' commerce clause power allows it to supplant 
state decisionmaking in the area of most economic activity arguably 
related to interstate commerce. Nevertheless, under the tenth 
amendment, Congress may not totally deprive a state government of 
the rightful maintenance of its sovereignty. 222 A constitutional 
distinction may exist between Congress' proper intervention in state 
decisionmaking in the area of interstate commerce and the federal 
government's improper requirement of state authorities to imple-
ment and enforce federal programs.223 The autonomy of state 
government includes the freedom from federal coercion to enact 
specific laws and freedom from being subject to penalties. Congress 
may, however, directly impose regulation with federal administra-
tion, or it may invite the state legislature to enact a suitable im-
plementation plan and administer it with state employees to avoid 
federal interference.224 Congress arguably has power under the com-
merce clause to introduce a federal system of coal taxation which 
would complement its present efforts to increase domestic coal con-
sumption. 
Prior to the OPEC oil embargo of 1973, the federal government 
maintained a low profile in developing a national energy policy. 225 
Regarding energy decisions as matters properly left to the private 
sector of the economy, the federal government intervened only to 
221. [d. at 443. 
222. See supra notes 17-18. 
223. Three Court of Appeals cases were decided in this manner; the cases involved the En-
vironmental Protection Agency's actions to enforce portions of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1857-1857(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies 
Hearings, supra note 6, at 161-62 (citing Dep't of Justice Memorandum: Constitutionality of 
the Energy Mobilization Board Proposal). See Brown v. EPA, 521 F.2d 827, 834-40 (9th Cir. 
1975); District of Columbia v. Train, 521 F.2d 971, 992-94 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Maryland v. EPA, 
530 F.2d 215, 225-28 (4th Cir. 1975). 
224. 530 F.2d 215, 228 (4th Cir. 1975); Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hear-
ings, supra note 6, at 162 (citing Dep't of Justice Memorandum; Constitutionality of the 
Energy Mobilization Board Proposal (1979». 
225. NAT'L TAX ASS'N - TAX INST. OF AMERICA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 72ND ANNUAL CON-
FERENCE, PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT OF ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES AND ENERGY CON-
SERVATION 275 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT OF ALTERNATIVE 
ENERGY SOURCES]' 
540 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:503 
mandate decreased oil and gas prices, thereby artificially increasing 
demand.226 In 1973, the nation found itself in the precarious position 
of relying on enormous energy imports, and the federal government 
began to assume a more dominant role in comprehensive policymak-
ing for all phases of national energy use. Presently, supply and de-
mand activities remain in the control of the private sector, but the 
federal government has assumed an active role in influencing fun-
damental market functions. 227 
As one aspect of its attack on foreign energy dependence, Con-
gress acted to increase domestic coal production and consumption. 
As with other components of its energy strategy, however, the con-
gressional approach to coal development has not been entirely ra-
tional. For example, although the nation's energy policy supposedly 
encourages increased coal development, no federal statute expressly 
outlines a comprehensive national coal policy.228 Instead, Congress 
has enunciated its national coal policy in several statutes and has 
chosen to implement that policy through its administration of the 
federal lands leasing program, the federal system of tax incentives, 
and the federal regulation of interstate transportation. 
1. Enunciation of a National Coal Policy 
The national policy concerning coal development is not found in 
the substantive language of any federal statute;229 instead, it exists 
only as a composite derived primarily from statements of findings 
and purposes of other energy-related statutes.230 The producers and 
utilities in Commonwealth Edison cited many federal statutes231 in 
support of their position that by increasing coal costs a severance tax 
frustrates a national policy which encourages coal consumption. Yet 
the only congressional pronouncements concerning coal production 
occur in legislative findings of over-dependence on foreign oil im-
ports232 and in statutory purposes to increase the development of 
domestic energy supplies.233 Thus, the Montana Supreme Court in 
226. [d. 
227. [d. 
228. See infra text and notes at notes 232·36. 
229. [d. 
230. See infra notes 232-33. 
231. [d. 
232. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5801-5891 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 
Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973,15 U.S.C. S§ 751-760h (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); 
Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978,15 U.S.C. SS 3301-3342 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
233. Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. 
SS 5901-5917 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 
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Commonwealth Edison noted, "[h]ow then can any court determine 
that the effect of Montana's coal severance tax is to frustrate na-
tional policy, when no national policy can be discerned as a matter of 
law?"234 State implementation of severance taxes in no way intrudes 
on the federal government's enunciated policies, as evidenced by the 
congressional statements. Beginning in 1973, Congress enacted 
legislation addressing the "national energy crisis"236 and encourag-
ing domestic energy resource development.236 The Federal Non-
nuclear Energy Research and Development Administration Act of 
1974,237 although not expressly referring to coal, presents the most 
specific statement of congressional intent to give priority to 
domestic energy production by finding that "domestic energy pro-
duction in this country must approximately double by the end of this 
century ... every form of energy [must] be put into use at the 
earliest possible moment, consistent with existing environmental 
laws, . . . new elements of energy production [must] be placed on 
line as quickly as possible."238 This general assertion is not, however, 
a strong indication of congressional intent to increase coal produc-
tion: it contains no suggestions on how to attain the goal of increased 
energy production; it never mentions the nation's coal resources as a 
solution; and it apparently expresses no opinion on the states' role in 
this energy development. Therefore, even if this general statement 
constitutes a national energy policy, it is too uncertain a statement to 
justify limiting the state's taxation power with respect to coal extrac-
tion. 
The only congressional scheme specifically encouraging coal con-
sumption is the Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1979 
(PIFUA).239 This Act states that coal is to be used as a primary 
energy source in lieu of natural gas or petroleum products and re-
quires that electric powerplants and major fuel-burning installations 
convert to coal.240 PIFUA also encourages the use of synfuels 
1974, 15 U.S.C. §§ 791-798 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 
1975, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975 & Supp. IV 1980); Powerplant and Industrial Fuel 
Use Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. §§ 8301-8483 (Supp. III 1979); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1857-1857(1) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
234. 615 P.2d 847, 861 (Mont. 1980). 
235. Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, 15 U.S.C. § 751(a)(3) (1976 & Supp. IV 
1980). 
236. See supra notes 232-33. 
237. 42 U.S.C. § 5901-5917 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
238. Pub. L. No. 95-39, June 3, 1977. See LAW REPRINTS. supra note 26, at 136. 
239. 42 U.S.C. SS 8341-8483 (Supp. III 1979). 
240. [d. at SS 8341-8343 (Supp. III 1979). 
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derived from coal as well as the rehabilitation of railroad service and 
equipment necessary for the transportation of coal.241 Interestingly, 
the Supreme Court in the Commonwealth Edison case pointed out 
that while the "only specific statutory provisions favoring the use of 
coal"242 are found in PIFUA, the statute "clearly contemplates the 
continued existence, not the preemption, of state severance taxes on 
coal and other minerals."243 Thus, Congress itself has acknowledged 
the state legislature's proper role in designing coal severance tax 
measures. 
Despite these attempts to enunciate a national coal policy, the 
federal government has not provided any specific direction to ac-
complish its goal of increased domestic coal development. In fact, the 
federal government's implementation of a cohesive national coal 
policy has been ineffective and irregular. 244 In analyzing the alleged 
conflict between federal and state governments in the taxation of 
coal production, the salient factors are the federal government's 
unclear position regarding a national coal policy and the state's clear 
interest in a coal severance tax. From this perspective, it is apparent 
that a federally enunciated coal policy has not developed sufficiently 
to conflict with state interests in resource severance taxation. 
2. Implementation of a National Coal Policy 
It is within a scattered and haphazard framework that one must 
analyze the national coal policy and its interaction with state coal 
severance taxes. A coherent and equitable coal policy has not been 
effectuated by the federal regulatory agencies - the Bureau of Land 
Management, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Interstate Com-
merce Commission - which playa role in western coal development. 
This section will describe in more detail the federal government's in-
volvement in coal development in order to determine the propriety of 
the federal legislative forum for dealing with the complexities of 
state taxation of resource production. 
a. Leasing of Federal Lands 
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920246 establishes the super-
visory structure to lease federal mineral lands. The Leasing Act and 
241. Id. at S 8301(b)(4)-(5) (Supp. III 1979). 
242. 453 U.S. 609, 634 (1981). 
243. Id. 
244. See infra text at notes 245-304. 
245. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-209 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 
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its provisions are crucial to the continued development of coal in the 
West because a substantial portion of western coal reserves are 
owned by the federal government.246 This significant federal 
presence is an aspect unique to the western energy resource market 
- the grant of lands to the federal government was exacted as a 
dowry before the newly settled and industry-poor western territories 
were allowed to join with the Union.247 The eastern, midwestern, 
and southern states are not encumbered by such an extensive federal 
ownership of state lands and resources.248 
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act was enacted only after many years 
of heated debate.249 The early 1900's saw many western Congress-
men fighting vehemently for the return of federal lands to the states 
either by sale to private interests or by reasserting the sovereignty 
of the states originally holding the lands. Nevertheless, the opposing 
view prevailed in 1920, and federal ownership in western lands was 
retained for the benefit of the entire country.250 Unfortunately, the 
arguments made in 1916 remain valid - federal control of mineral-
rich lands results in "the perpetual bureaucratic domination that [is] 
exercised from Washington in their administration and control". 251 
The western coal-producing states are completely dependent upon 
246. Approximately 60 percent of all western coal reserves are owned by the federal 
government. COAL COMPETITION, supra note 24, at 10,692 (1981). Actual federal control is even 
greater, however, because of land ownership patterns, with an additional 20 percent of 
reserves dependent on the availability of complementary federal coal for its production. [d. at 
10,700; [1981] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 387:24-25. 
247. The federal government owns over 75 percent of Nevada's and Idaho's land. Montana 
has 28 percent of its land in public hands, with 75 percent of its coal under federal control. 
Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 85 (statement of 
Mont. Att'y Gen. Mike Greely). 
It should be noted here that Alaska was in a particularly good bargaining position to enter 
the Union - able to retain the right to 90 percent of all royalties and revenues from federal 
lands in the state. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 49 (statement of N.M. U.S. 
Sen. Pete Domenici); id. at 67 (statement of Minnesota U.S. Sen. David Durenberger). 
248. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 88 (quoting Energy: Limiting State Coal 
Severance Taxes, report by the Congressional Research Service (1980». In states without 
federal ownership of mineral lands, private parties are free to lease and produce mineral 
reserves in a healthy competitive market subject only to the strictures imposed by the state 
itself. See infra text at notes 260-54. 
249. Hearings began in 1914 to determine if public lands should be retained by the federal 
government and, if so, how they were to be administered. See Montana District Court opinion 
Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 259-60 
(unpublished opinion) (citing H.R. REP. No. 668 (Part 2) 63d Cong., 2d Sess. (1914); H.R. REP. 
No. 17 (Part 2) 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916». 
250. Pub. L. No. 146, 41 Stat. 437 (Feb. 25, 1920). 
251. H.R. REP. No. 17 (part 2), 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1916) (minority views). See Brief for 
the United States as Amicus Curiae at 10 n.5, Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 
U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 722. 
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pletely dependent upon the Bureau of Land Management for the 
continued leasing of its land, the equitable pricing of those leases, 
and the efficient oversight of the rights granted through the 
leases.252 The Bureau of Land Management alone determines when 
and where leases will be offered. Federal regulation sets the charges 
for rentals, royalties, and bonuses required to lease public lands. 253 
This federal control of leasing rights over large areas of western 
states necessarily intrudes on those states' supervision of resource 
development within their borders.254 
Under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act, the coal-producing states 
share all revenues255 from federal coal leases with the federal 
government.256 The states in which coal mining occurs receive 50 
percent of all money collected from sales, bonuses, royalties, and 
rentals of the public lands within their borders.257 The money 
received by each state is spent as its legislature directs, giving priori-
ty to those areas socially or economically affected by development of 
the mineral leases which generate the revenue. The funds allocated 
to such impact areas are used for planning, construction, and 
maintenance of public facilities and provision of public services.258 
The remaining 50 percent of the federal revenues from public lands 
is disbursed by the federal government. Forty percent of the federal 
share becomes part of a reclamation fund under the Reclamation Act 
of 1902.259 These funds are restrictively allocated - only designated 
states participate and only to the extent necessary to fund the con-
struction and maintenance of irrigation projects to reclaim arid and 
semi-arid regions.26o The final 10 percent of federal leasing revenues 
goes directly into the United States Treasury.261 
252. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-209 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). 
253. [d. The Secretary of the Interior promulgates regulations. 
254. See Plummer, The Federal Role in Rocky Mountain Energy Development, 17 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 241 (1977). 
255. The federal government receives revenues under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act in 
three principal forms: bonuses, royalties, and annual rental charges for the acreage leased. 
One study concluded that rates charged under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 are con-
siderably lower than charges imposed by private land owners. See Morgan & Olson, Non-
neutral Features of Energy Taxation, 20 NAT RESOURCES J. 853, 874 (1980). At present, bid-
ders compete according to the amount of bonus they will pay; the royalty is fixed at a minimum 
rate of 12 112 percent of market value of surface-mined coal; the annual rentals are prescribed 
by regulation. 43 C.F.R. 3473.3 (1981); 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). 
256. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). 
257. [d. 
258. [d. 
259. 43 U.S.C. §§ 391-391a-1 (1976). 
260. [d. 
261. 30 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). 
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The administration of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act has been less 
than effective. Due to the long-term nature of the leases262 and the 
unforeseen increase in coal production in the 1970's, the federal 
government found itself holding leases extremely favorable to the 
lessees, in some cases with an annual rental charge of only $1 per 
acre. 263 In response to this situation, the federal government 
imposed a moratorium in 1971 on the leasing of new coallands.264 
This moratorium was also designed to stop energy companies from 
leasing tracts at minimal cost and waiting for coal prices to rise 
before beginning production.265 Many of the original Act's finan-
cially archaic provisions were corrected when Congress amended the 
Act in 1975.266 Although the amendments were designed to produce 
revenues which reflected the true market values of the land, the 
moratorium on new leases continued for ten years. Exceptions to the 
leasing ban were allowed only to avoid a mine shutdown in the case 
of a continuous seam running onto unleased federal lands or to pre-
vent the loss of federal coal which might occur if a producer was 
forced to mine around unleased reserves. 267 The inefficient manage-
ment of federally owned land, leading eventually to a complete 
moratorium on leasing, contradicts the assertion that a national 
policy to encourage coal production has been effectively established. 
The result of the federal government's domination of leasing prac-
tices has been the creation of a de facto monopoly on federal coal 
lands.268 Competition among the coal producers is discouraged 
262. Federal coal leases are granted for 20 year terms with extensions available so long as 
commercial quantities of coal are produced. 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976). 
263. See infra note 275. 
264. See [1980] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 376:16. 
265. [d. at 16-17. The moratorium was lifted on April 28, 1982 by the coal lease sale of 13 
tracts of land in Montana and Wyoming involving more than 1.5 billion tons of coal. [1982] 
ENV'T REP. (BNA) CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS 169. 
266. Under the original 1920 Act, land was not always leased on a competitive basis and 
therefore did not always yield the revenues available in a competitive system. The Secretary 
was authorized to issue prospecting permits and if the permittee demonstrated the existence 
of coal, he was entitled to lease the tract on a noncompetitive basis. 30 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1970). 
In addition, the Secretary was entitled to waive, suspend or reduce the rental or minimum 
royalty, and reduce the production royalty, whenever necessary to promote development. 30 
U.S.C. § 209 (1970). See Brieffor the United States as Amicus Curiae at 6 n.3, Commonwealth 
Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW REPRINTS. supra note 26, at 
718. The Amendments of 1975 raised royalty charges, now 12 112 percent of value, from a 
minimum of 5 cents per ton; rental charges are now prescribed by regulations; competitive bid-
ding is required in all cases, see 45 Fed. Reg. 84928 (1980); and a license system for exploration 
was established which gives no right or preference to a subsequent lease, see 43 C.F.R. 
3430.0-7 (1981). 
267. COAL COMPETITION. supra note 24, at 10,701 n.12 (1981). 
268. [1981] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 419:1299 (based on an American Enterprise In-
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because private lessors do not control large enough blocks of land to 
make mining profitable; coal prices are inflated by limiting competi-
tion to the few private leases available.269 Futhermore, patterns of 
federal coal leasing present a disturbing picture. In the 1950's, in-
dividuals and independent corporations held 72 percent of all federal 
lands under lease - that figure is now 31 percent.270 Almost half of 
the federal coal acreage currently under lease is held by subsidiaries 
of oil, gas, nuclear, and electric utility conglomerates.271 The federal 
government's involvement in western coal development has, thus, 
tended to result in the concentration of ownership and economic 
benefits in large corporate holdings.272 
The Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920 established the federal 
government's power to control and lease a substantial portion of 
western coal reserves. The revenue allocation provisions of the Act, 
however, do not adequately compensate the producing state for the 
loss of control over its mineral rich land.273 The state loses a large 
portion of its potential property tax base because no property tax is 
paid on federallands.274 In addition, the 50 percent share of federal 
leasing revenues which goes directly to the coal-producing state does 
not currently produce a large amount of revenue because the majori-
ty of federal leases remain grossly undervalued.276 Because the 40 
percent restrictive allocation to the reclamation fund may not be ex-
pended by the state as it deems necessary,276 those revenues are of 
little use to the state in mitigating the impacts of coal development 
accompanying federal leasing. Furthermore, the ten-year morato-
stitute study). 
269. [1980] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 380:9. 
270. [1981] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 398:566. See also COAL COMPETITION, supra note 24, 
at 10,687. 
271. [1981] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 398:566. 
272. For a statement concerning the control of these large corporate conglomerates over 
the coal industry see the Cartel Restriction Act: Hearings on H.R. 4661 before the Subcomm. on 
Consumer Protection and Finance of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce 
9th Cong., 2d Sess. 126, 136 (June 26, 1980) (statement of S. David Freeman, Chairman of the 
Board of TVA). 
273. In 1979, Montana received $555,000 from its one-half of federal receipts under the Act. 
Yet the state's Coal Board, which is responsible for assisting those areas affected by coal 
development, must spend nearly ten times that each year. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra 
note 9, at 153 (statement of Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe). 
274. See supra note 182. 
275. The annual rental charge was restricted under the 1920 Act to a minimum of 25 cents 
per acre in the first year and not less than $1 per acre after five years. 30 U.S.C. § 207 (1976); 
Plummer, supra note 254, at 242; Moyer, The Role of Coal: Problems and Policies, 18 NAT. 
RESOURCES J. 761, 768-69 (1978). 
276. 43 U.S.C. §§ 391-391a-1 (1976). 
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rium on federal leasing of mining areas in effect destroyed the 
revenue-producing potential of the remaining unleased land. As a 
consequence of all these factors, the state receives much less 
revenue under the Mineral Lands Leasing Act than it would if the 
land were leased directly by the state. Both the explicit language of 
the Act and its operation encourage the imposition of a state 
severance tax to ensure the receipt of adequate compensation for the 
state's mined resources. 
b. Taxing Electric Utilities 
Electric utilities consume most of the coal produced in the United 
States.277 Not only do they consume coal - the electric utilities are 
involved in its production as well. At least 30 percent of all coal 
mined on federal land is produced by utilities.278 This phenomenon of 
production by the consumer is known as "vertical integration."279 
The coal mined is used as fuel for a generating station located at the 
mine mouth. The electricity generated in coal-producing states is 
then transmitted across power lines to energy-importing states.280 
Vertical integration is encouraged by tax policies which give utilities 
economic advantages over independent coal producers. 
The federal government's special tax treatment of electric utilities 
affects the coal industry in two ways. First, the tax advantages af-
forded utilities lessen their incentive to enter long-term supply con-
tracts with independent coal producers; yet, long-term supply con-
tracts increase coal companies' efficiency and decrease coal 
prices.281 Secondly, federal tax policies encourage the utilities' 
reliance on their own coal production, which appears to be less effi-
cient than comparable independent coal mines and may cause higher 
prices.282 Thus, federal taxation decisions are largely responsible for 
the electric utility industry's position as a major coal producer, as 
well as the major coal consumer. 
Most electric utilities are publicly regulated monopolies and, as 
such, are allowed certain tax advantages by the Internal Revenue 
277. The electric utility market accounts for 72% of coal consumption in the United States. 
See Moyer, supra note 275, at 765. 
278. The utilities held 21 percent of the federal coal acreage under lease in 1979. [1981] 
ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 398:566. In addition, energy companies, natural gas pipeline com-
panies, and smaller oil and gas companies together held 31 percent of all outstanding leases 
and produced 29 percent of the coal mined in 1979. Id. 
279. STATE TAXATION, supra note 151, at 10. 
280. See Link, supra note 148. Conversation with BiJI Schwarzkoph, Reclamation Super-
visor, Western Energy Company, Colstrip, Montana (Jan. 8, 1982). 
281. COAL COMPETITION, supra note 24, at 10,695. 
282. Id. 
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Service. Publicly owned utilities which use no private investment 
capital are exempt from federal income taxation.283 In addition to 
that favored status, some of these utilities may also benefit from tax-
exempt municipal bond financing284 which permits their capital ex-
penditures to be financed at lower interest rates than those available 
to their coal-producing competitors. Thus, the Internal Revenue 
Service places these public utilities in a favorable competitive posi-
tion to enter the coal industry and to produce their own coal. 
The electric utilities which are privately owned are not exempt 
from federal income taxation. They do, however, benefit substantial-
ly from a federal tax policy285 which allows utilities to collect from 
their consumers federal income taxes which are not paid. These 
"phantom taxes" occur through the operation of accelerated 
depreciation deductions,286 depletion allowances,287 and investment 
credits288 which offset the utilities' federal income tax liabilities. Un-
fortunately, the utilities' tax reductions are not passed on to their 
consumers.289 The actual benefits to the utilities are enormous. In 
1978, the nation's 100 largest power companies charged their con-
283. The tax exempt status of public utilities, as defined in I.R.C. § 247(b)(1) (1981), is pro-
vided by I.R.C. § 115(1) (1981). 
284. In addition to their tax exempt status, some utilities also benefit from tax exempt 
municipal bond financing. See Morgan & Olson, supra note 255, at 866 (citing I.R.C. §§ 75, 115 
(1981». 
285. This federal tax policy involves the tacit approval of state utility commissions' deci-
sions permitting the utilities to charge their consumers for taxes not paid. 
286. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 established the Accelerated Cost Recovery 
System which permits recovery of capital costs for tangible depreciable property over periods 
of time significantly shorter than the useful life of that property. For public utilities, property 
may be depreciated over a 5-, 10-, or 15-year period, depending upon the type of property. See 
I.R.C. § 167 (1982). This accelerated depreciation provides large deductions to property-
owning utilities which reduce their federal income tax liabilities accordingly. 
287. Depletion allowances compensate the mineral owner for the gradual reduction of the 
natural resource reserve. I.R.C. 5S 611-613A (1981). Morgan & Olson, supra note 255, at 862; 
NAT'L TAX ASS'N TAX INST. OF AMERICA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 72d ANNuAL CONFERENCE, TAXA-
TION AND NATURAL RESOURCE PRODUCTION TRENDS, 294, 304 (1979) [hereinafter cited as TAXA-
TION AND NATURAL RESOURCE PRODUCTION]. The deductions provide a major benefit to the coal 
industry by accelerating the recovery of capital costs expended to develop the depletable prop-
erty. See Treas. Regs. SS 1.611-1.613 (1982). 
288. I.R.C. SS 46-48 (1981). 
289. State utility commissions determine what expenses are passed through to consumers. 
The utility company's federal income tax liability can be handled by either of two approaches: 
the tax liability can "flow through" to the consumer - an approach where both burdens and 
benefits go to the consumer; or the tax liability can be "normalized" - where the effective 
rate taken from tax tables is applied to projected income yielding the amount to be paid by the 
consumer. This latter approach does not allow the consumer to benefit from the utility's tax 
deductions and credits, resulting in "phantom taxes." Conversation with Steven Ferrey, Nat'l 
Consumer Law Center, Boston (Feb. 23,1982). 
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sumers $3.5 billion for federal income taxes; the utilities paid only 
$797 million in taxes to the federal government; they kept $2.74 
billion.290 Consequently, both publicly-owned and privately-owned 
electric utilities benefit from federal tax policies which improve the 
utilities' position to mine coal. 
The electric utilities' involvement in western coal production is 
significant and results in part from federal tax policies. The special 
tax treatment afforded publicly-owned utilities creates an imbalance 
in the marketplace by giving utilities a competitive advantage in the 
production of coal. The unusual economic position of privately-
owned utilities creates inequity in the marketplace, where con-
sumers pay higher energy prices through phantom taxes. While the 
utilities have actively lobbied291 against state coal severance taxes as 
imposing an intolerable burden on their consumers, these same 
utilities continue to benefit from federal tax advantages which in-
crease consumers' energy costs. Federal tax policies - the tax ex-
empt status of public utilities and the acceptance of phantom taxes -
undermine the argument that the national energy policy seeks 
minimal energy costs and maximum production efficiency, par-
ticularly to encourage the consumption of coal. These federal tax 
choices negate the allegation that state severance taxes increase 
energy costs to the extent that a conflict arises with a national coal 
policy. 
c. Regulating Railroad Rates 
The railroads' largest customer is the western coal industry.292 
The Interstate Commerce Commission regulates rail transporta-
tion293 and presently permits freight rates to comprise up to 75 per-
cent of the delivered price of coal.294 As an example, Montana coal 
290. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 589-91 (statement of David Alberswerth, 
Western Organization of Resource Councils); id. at 325 (statement of Mont. State Sen. 
Thomas E. Towe). 
291. The National Coal Consumers Alliance (NCCA) has spent approximately $100,000 per 
month during the last two years to limit state coal severance taxes. Coal Severance Tax Hear-
ing, supra note 1, at 170 (statement of the Wyoming Outdoor Council). In Montana, $800,000 
was spent for lobbying to limit the coal severance tax rate. Federal Preemption of State 
Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 77 (statement of Mont. Att'y Gen., Mike Greely). 
292. Coal: Transportation Hangups Cause Headaches as Industry Tries to Increase Ex-
ports, [1980] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 376:21. 
293. 49 U.S.C. §§ 10701-10786 (Supp. IV 1980). 
294. On a per ton basis, transportation costs dwarf the state's severance tax burden. Mon-
tana's severance tax runs approximately $2.45 per ton, while the cost of transporting that ton 
to Detroit is $17.25. During 1980, the increase alone of railroad rates nearly equalled the en-
tire revenues from the Montana severance tax. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 
550 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 10:503 
costs $35 per ton when delivered to Austin, Texas. Of that amount, 
$28 is the freight charge and only $1.41 is attributable to the coal 
severance tax.295 Moreover, the Interstate Commerce Commission 
has been liberal in granting rate increases. In one year, the increase 
in freight rates alone exceeded the entire revenue from Montana's 
coal severance tax.296 The Interstate Commerce Commission is 
responsible for administering the interstate transportation system in 
accordance with federal policy. The large proportion of coal prices 
attributable to rail freight rates indicates a policy by the Interstate 
Commerce Commission which hampers coal consumption far more 
than a state's coal severance tax. Such Interstate Commerce Com-
mission regulation provides further support for the contention that 
there is no coherent national policy on coal with which a state's coal 
severance tax could conflict. 
A possible by-product of the federal regulation of rail rates is the 
increased economic role of a limited number of railroad companies in 
the western states' resource market. 297 For example, BUrlington 
Northern, Inc. moves almost all of Montana's coa1.298 It is the largest 
employer in Montana, with over 8,500 employees.299 Burlington 
Northern is also the largest private land holder in Montana - com-
bined with other railroads, it owns approximately 15 percent of Mon-
tana land, and it holds the mineral rights to much more. 300 It is 
interesting to note that more than 16 billion tons of western coal are 
owned by the railroads. 301 Federal acquiescence to the commanding 
presence of the railroads in the coal industry illustrates a disturbing 
aspect of federal energy policy: that a state's resources will be con-
trolled, priced, and sold by out-of-state corporations which do not ful-
ly consider that state's best interests. Therefore, state taxation of 
resource taxation is indirectly encouraged, at least as a means to re-
tain a portion of the state's lost economic base. 
Federal regulation of the coal industry has not consistently 
resulted in increased coal production or consumption. The morato-
100 (statement of N.D. U.S. Rep. Byron L. Dorgan). See Church, supra note B, at 272. 
295. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 13 (statement of Mont. U.S. Sen. John 
Melcher). 
296. Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 100 (statement of N.D. U.S. Rep. Byron 
L. Dorgan); Link, supra note 148, at 266. 
297. Coal: Transportation Hangups Cause Headaches as Industry Tries to Increase Ex-
ports, [1980] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA), 376:19-22. 
298. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 109 (citing Minneapolis Star, June 10, 
1980). 
299. Id. 
300. Id.; [1980] ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 380:9. 
301. Id. 
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rium on new leases of federal coal lands, the tax advantages pro-
vided to electric utilities, and the significant charges and control per-
mitted to the railroad industry all evidence federal involvement in 
the coal industry which has little to do with increasing the production 
of this natural resource. Federal involvement appears to result only 
in fewer companies controlling more coal than ever before with 
greater cost to the consumer.802 Under federal supervision, the coal 
industry's competitive marketplace is becoming limited to large 
utilities, energy companies, and the railroads.808 Thus, federal 
legislative action in this area does not indicate a national energy 
policy exists which is sufficient to preclude state taxation. Never-
theless, concerns that the exclusive state control of energy resources 
would fracture the market for resources on which the entire nation 
depends are not unreasonable. Such concerns, however, do not 
undermine the apparent suitability of the state legislative forum to 
set resource taxation schemes. Without a clear and cohesive national 
policy, federal intervention in the state taxation of its energy 
resources raises fears for national unity.304 The next section 
presents a resolution of the dilemma - who should decide the ap-
propriate level of energy resource taxation? 
c. Resolution: Who Should Develop Resource Taxation? 
The proper forum 'for determining equitable levels of coal 
severance taxes is the state legislature. The state legislature is the 
more capable government body because it is closer to the "numerous 
and competing economic, geographic, demographic, social and 
political considerations that must inform a decision about an accept-
able rate or level of state taxation. "306 The state government, along 
with local and federal governments, creates the public policy which 
shapes the pace and direction of energy resource development; but it 
is the national marketplace which ultimately determines the viability 
302. See supra text at notes 268-72, 283-91, 297-30l. 
303. Id. 
304. "In his recent book, The Third Wave, author Alvin Toffler cites the nation's energy 
crisis as a catalyst that could lead to a breakdown in national unity." Coal Severance Tax Hear-
ing, supra note 1, at 98 (citing U.S. News & World Report, June 16, 1980). 
In addition, there exists a generally-held view that "[w]hen serious problems do arise, it is 
usually the federal government, not the state government, which is responsible." Federal 
Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 12 (statement of Joseph E. 
McElwain, Chairman of Montana Power Company and Representative of the Western 
Regional Council). See also [1980] ENERGY USERS REp. (BNA) 376:15. 
305. Commonwealth Edison Company v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 628 (1981). 
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of that public policy.306 Excessive coal severance tax rates would be 
precluded in a competitive marketplace. 
The Montana state legislature, in particular, enacted its 30 percent 
coal severance tax only after fully considering the possible com-
petitive disadvantages which would result.307 Assertions that the 
level of Montana's tax has inhibited coal production are refuted by 
increased production levels and recent market demand. Production 
increased 31 percent in 1980 to more than 34 million tons .. 308 In addi-
tion, a long-term contract has been entered recently for 250 million 
tons of Montana coal; it is the largest coal contract in the history of 
the industry. 309 In this context the rate of taxation acceptable in the 
marketplace is likely to be closer to the socially optimal price of coal 
than would be a federally regulated price.310 
Despite the marketplace's acceptance of Montana's coal severance 
tax, the political system has not been as tolerant. Congress has con-
sidered several bills to place a percentage limit on coal severance tax 
rates.311 Regulated prices often serve to provide energy resources to 
the nation's consumers at less than cost;312 such federal intervention 
to decrease energy prices would encourage consumption. The artifi-
cially induced reliance on cheap coal, however, could result in the 
waste of a nonrenewable resource, exploitation of a unique region's 
environment, and the demise of an American heritage known as "the 
West." Recent federal laws have stressed the importance of allowing 
energy prices to rise, both to reflect true market prices of the 
resources and to allow the overall costs of energy production to be in-
ternalized in energy prices.313 Alfred Kahn, in congressional tes-
timony, explained: 
it is widely recognized that economic efficiency alone requires 
that all pertinent social costs, internal and external, be levied in 
306. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 33 (statement 
of Robert Hall, Representative of Western Governors' Policy Office). 
307. Montana Coal Council Report, supra note 43. 
308. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 78 (statement 
of Mont. Att'y Gen., Mike Greely). 
309. [d. 
310. Production Trends, in TAXATION AND NATURAL RESOURCE PRODUCTION, Ilupra note 287, 
at 304; Commerce Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 164 (statement of James C. Rosapepe, 
Multistate Tax Commission). 
311. The 96th Congress saw the introduction of four severance tax cap measures - S. 2695, 
H.R. 6625, H.R. 6654 and H.R. 7163. The 97th Congress repeated the process with S. 178 and 
H.R.1313. 
312. PREFERENTIAL TAX TREATMENT OF ALTERNATE ENERGY SOURCES, SUpl"a note 225, at 
275. 
313 H. REP. No. 218, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
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one way or another on the particular acts of production or con-
sumption causally responsible for them. This will eliminate the 
subsidization; by confronting consumers with prices reflecting 
the full social costs of supplying them, it will ensure that no ac-
tivities will be carried on whose total incremental costs exceed 
their benefits. And it will ensure, also, that production will be 
carried on by methods that minimize total costs, rather than on-
ly those costs that happen to fall on the producer. 314 
553 
Federal attempts to override state severance taxes are inappropri-
ate because coal prices would be prevented from rising to reflect true 
cost. 
The public policy rationale of increased coal production at a 
decreased cost currently used to justify federal intervention in state 
severance tax systems correlates with the general deemphasis of en-
vironmental concerns and the growing attention paid to energy and 
economic needs.315 Extreme care must be taken to ensure that the 
renewed national emphasis on coal does not result in the costly 
sacrifice of putatively "worthless" undeveloped prairie lands to 
economically "worthwhile" strip-mining. Such is the responsibility 
of both the federal and state governments in implementing a unified 
coal policy. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES 
Notwithstanding the foregoing conclusion that state-imposed coal 
severance taxes are an acceptable means of compensating the state 
for costs of increased development, a hue and cry has arisen from the 
energy-importing states attacking the validity of such taxation. 
Perhaps the conflict is due to the focus on coal as the salvation of the 
nation's energy woes;316 perhaps because the percentage measure of 
the tax is higher for coal than other energy resources;317 perhaps the 
NEWS 593, 599 (Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act); H. REP. No. 294, 95th Cong., 
1st Sess., reprinted in [1977] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. NEWS 1077, 1150-51 (Clean Air Act 
Amendments of 1977). Cf S. REP. No. 141, 95th Congo 2d Sess., reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE 
CONGo & AD. NEWS 7660, 7679 (Public Utilities Regulatory Policies Act). See Amicus Curiae 
Brief of the Environmental Defense Fund, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Sierra 
Club at 151-16, Commonwealth Edison CO. V. Montana, 453 U.S. 609 (1981), reprinted in LAW 
REPRINTS, supra note 26, at 607-08. 
314. Executive Branch Review of Environmental Regulations: Hearing before the Subcomm. 
on Environmental Pollution of the Senate Comm. on Environmental and Public Works, 96th 
Cong., 1st Sess., 406 (statement of Alfred Kahn, Chairman of the Council on Wage and Price 
Stability). 
315. Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 136 (Appen' 
dix, paper of Prof. Daniel H. Henning). 
316. See supra text at note 37. 
317. See supra text at note 31. 
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federal ownership of western coal provides a more persuasive van-
tage point for the utility companies' lobbying efforts;318 or perhaps 
the sparse population of the western states provides less of an 
obstacle to economic pressures.319 In any event, the imposition of 
coal severance taxes has become the rallying point for such cries 
from the energy-importing states as "economic war between the 
states" and "American OPEC," and such retorts from the energy-
producing states as "neocolonial exploitation" and "let them freeze 
in the dark."320 
The present polarization of the country's energy-producing and 
energy-importing regions can be ameliorated by implementation of 
one or more of three alternatives which will be detailed in the follow-
ing sections. The purpose of all three proposals is to effect a 
geographic redistribution of energy resource revenues, premised on 
the assumption that it is to both regions' advantage to minimize the 
losses and hardships due to energy costS.321 The first, and most en-
compassing recommendation is the creation of an Interstate Council 
into which every state will pool a portion of its resource revenues. 
These revenues will then be disbursed to those states requiring 
special assistance. The second alternative looks back to the New 
Deal days of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in advocating 
that the provision of low-cost financing be made available to those 
energy importing localities in difficult financial straits. Under this 
plan, the lending would be done by the energy-producing states from 
their resource revenues, rather than by the federal government. The 
third proposal is addressed to the federal government and concerns 
the reformulation of current revenue sharing computations in order 
to more equitably reflect the state's need for federal assistance. 
A. Interstate Pooling of Revenues 
The first alternative to the present conflict over energy resource 
taxation centers on the creation of a non-federal, Interstate 
Council. 322 This Council would be composed of a representative from 
318. See supra text at notes 246-48, 291. 
319. See supra text and notes at notes 143-45. 
320. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 97 -98 (citing U.S. News & World Report, 
June 16, 1980); id. at 94 (citing Washington Post, April 20, 1980). 
321. If an energy-importing state becomes financially insolvent, the energy-producing state 
will also be harmed by decreased sales and increased defaults. 
322. This type of proposal was first presented in 1979 and 1980 by two Canadian 
economists, Anthony Scott and John F. Helliwell, working under the University of British Col-
umbia's Programme in Natural Resource Economics, financed by the Social Sciences and 
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every state323 and would work cooperatively with the states in the 
areas of resource taxation and natural resource management. It 
would perform two broad functions: the collection of a portion of 
each state's resource revenues; and the promotion of agreement on 
pooling these revenues to be shared among the states.324 The Council 
would provide cohesiveness of action in the area of resource taxation 
without assigning this troublesome area to the federal government. 
It would keep state resource revenues discrete from federally ad-
ministered assistance programs; it would retain the state's 
autonomy over its own resource base325 as complementary to federal 
energy policy. 
Admittedly, a non-federal Interstate Council of this kind is all but 
unknown in North America. Such a body has been proposed in 
Canada to deal with the provincial revenues of Alberta, Saskatch-
ewan, and British Columbia. 326 In addition, West Germany has long 
had a system of interstate sharing in which the strong junior govern-
ments bypassed the central government to establish their own in-
terstate financial linkages.327 The West German Bundesrat is il-
lustrative of the proposed Council in its development of a transfer 
mechanism which is separate from and smaller than other economic 
measures in which the German federal government is involved.328 
An American Interstate Council could operate on a much more 
restricted level, limiting its activities to the equitable allocation of 
resource revenues. 
The purpose of interstate pooling of resource revenues would be to 
redistribute geographically some of the energy-producing states' 
resource revenues. The procedural aspects of the Council's opera-
tions are sketched as follows. All states would contribute a certain 
portion of their total resource revenues to a separate interstate 
pool. 329 Revenues from all natural resources would be pooled, in-
Humanities Research Council of Canada. J. F. HELLIWELL, RESOURCES PAPERS (1980); A. 
SCOTT, RESOURCES PAPERS (1980). 
323. Each state's tax commissioner would be specially qualified to serve on such a Council. 
324. See A. SCO'IT, DIVIDED JURISDICTIONS OVER NATURAL RESOURCE REVENUES, RESOURCES 
PAPER No. 52, at 25 (June, 1980). 
325. Some would argue that operation of the Council would unacceptably derogate state 
autonomy to other states. Nonetheless, cooperation among the states has been evidenced in 
Congressional coalitions, regional commissions, and governors' councils. Faced with federal 
meddling into state tax rates, the states foreseeably might be willing to submit to a sister 
state. See A. SCOTT, supra note 324, at 30. 
326. See supra note 322. 
327. A. SCOTT, supra note 324, at 27. 
328. [d. at 33-34. 
329. Resource revenues: (a) are used to lower the price of the resource to consumers below 
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cluding non-mineral renewable resources.330 The Interstate Council 
would determine not only the proportion of revenues to be pooled, 
but the average rate of tax for each resource as well. The pooled 
revenue could be divided annually based upon interstate negotiation 
reflecting such factors as state need, per capita personal income, and 
population.331 The fund would break even on a year-to-year basis and 
would serve only to redistribute a portion of the significant state in-
come from resource development. 332 
The role of the resource revenue Council would be to exercise an 
increased level of control over the states' relationships with each 
other. Arguably, that control is specifically granted to Congress by 
the commerce clause; however, use of that power is also discre-
tionary. In the troublesome case of state taxation of energy 
resources, it may well be preferable for Congress to allow the states 
to "even things out" among themselves through a separate decision-
making body. Congress' decisionmaking machinery is often un-
wieldy and its political process is often incapable of providing the 
flexible maneuvering required of any economic redistribution. The 
Council, on the other hand, would be composed of individuals 
familiar with their state's revenue needs and tax systems.333 Such an 
interstate body would be well-equipped to consider requests for 
assistance and would be able to compromise. 
The energy-importing states can be expected to be willing par-
ticipants to such a pooling of resource revenues. The energy-
producing states will require a number of incentives in order to in-
duce them to part with rightfully gotten gains. First, only a portion 
of their resource revenues would be pooled. The computation of that 
portion would be based on a surplus, a residue after all necessary 
costs of resource development and replacement are met. Therefore, 
the voluntary pooling of revenues would apply only to excess 
receipts.334 The energy-producing states' willingness to accept a 
large transfer of resource revenues may also be premised on the 
preference of voluntary action as opposed to federal control of those 
its expected market level; (b) flow into the dividends of operating companies' shareholders or 
the wages of the companies' workers; and (c) become public revenues to the extent royalties, 
fees, and taxes are paid from them. A. SCOTT, supra note 324, at 19-20. 
330. Non-mineral renewable resources would include production of timber, which has a 
"severance" tax levy in Virginia. VA. CODE S 58-939 (1974 & Supp. 1981). 
331. A. SCOTT, supra note 324, at 20. 
332. J. F. HELLIWELL, Ta:eation and Energy Policy, RESOURCES PAPERNo. 47,10 (January, 
1980). 
333. See supra note 323. 
334. A. SCOTT, supra note 324, at 18-19. 
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same revenues. 335 In addition, all producing states are cognizant of 
the boom-and-bust cycle in resource development. They realize that 
the present increased level of revenues will not continue indefinitely. 
In future years, the states with later-developing resource bases will 
be sharing their increased revenues. 336 Voluntary participation in a 
revenue pooling system might also mitigate another phenomenon 
related to resource development - financially-induced migration. 337 
For an example, providing financial assistance to the Northeast 
could possibly reduce the large numbers of people migrating to the 
Southwest in search of better economic conditions. Moreover, the 
federal government could provide both regulatory and tax incentives 
to participation in the pooled fund. 338 It might even agree to include 
its share of royalty receipts from federal lands in the Council's 
funds. 339 Such amounts are negligible under the Mineral Lands Leas-
335. Testimony before a Congressional hearing examined the adverse precedential effect of 
federal interference in state tax systems: 
The precedent is overwhelming. If Congress can reduce the coal tax in Montana to 
produce cheaper electricity for the rest of the Nation, it can reduce the oil severance 
tax in Texas and Louisiana to produce cheaper gasoline, the wood products tax in 
Oregon to produce cheaper lumber, the iron ore tax in Minnesota to produce cheaper 
steel products, and the single business tax in Michigan to produce cheaper 
automobiles. It isn't very far from these to a law that would limit the sales tax in Il-
linois or the income tax in Iowa to allow farmers to grow slightly cheaper corn. Or a 
law that would limit the property tax in New York to allow larger dividends from cor-
porations with large corporate headquarters in New York City. 
Federal Preemption of State Energy Policies Hearings, supra note 6, at 45 (statement of 
Mont. State Sen. Thomas E. Towe). 
336. Those increased revenues may be substantial as reserves dwindle and prices escalate. 
The eastern seaboard has not built a new refinery since 1957, yet offshore oil and gas explora-
tion is beginning. Ohio prohibits development of Lake Erie, yet an estimated reserve of 650 
billion cubic feet of natural gas is being developed by Canada with over 300 wells drilled across 
the Lake. NAT'L TAX ASS'N-TAX INST. OF AMERICA, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 72d ANNUAL CON· 
FERENCE, LOUISIANA'S FIRST USE TAX, 197 (1979) [hereinafter cited as LOUISIANA'S FIRST USE 
TAX]. 
337. J. F. HELLIWELL, The Distribution of Energy Revenues Within Canada: Functional or 
Factional Federalism? RESOURCES PAPER No. 48, at 12,17 (Feb. 1980). By contrast, the Senate 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations concluded state tax differentials do not 
create a problem in influencing interregional development, finding instead "that powerful 
economic forces that have been at work for decades underlie much of the continuing inter-
regional redistribution of people, capital, and jobs." ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERN· 
MENTAL RELATIONS, INTERSTATE TAX COMPETITION, TAX NOTES 1061 (May 11, 1981). 
338. A regulatory incentive might include using the level of participation in the interstate 
fund as a factor in computing federal revenue sharing portions. See infra text at notes 347-54. 
Tax incentives might include increased depreciation deductions available to projects within 
participating states, or even a direct tax exempt government subsidy. 
339. See J. F. HELLIWELL, supra note 337, at 17. 
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ing Act of 1920, but are considerable for Outer Continental Shelf oil 
and gas drilling rights.340 
The ability of the Council to survive would be based on its ability to 
distribute benefits and burdens. All Americans hold a strong claim to 
the benefits of a publicly-owned resource base; every state shares its 
burden of interdependence with both energy-producing and energy-
importing sister states alike. Enormous and largely unforeseen fiscal 
pressures have been caused by the radical rise in values of unevenly 
distributed resources. The ability of the American federalist system 
to cope with these pressures will almost surely lie in the maintenance 
of flexibility. Allocation of federal tasks and state revenues to an un-
precedented Interstate Council would doubtless be a difficult 
endeavor. 341 The chief dilemma facing the Council lies in the immen-
sity of the resource revenues themselves - these revenues bring 
such wealth that they challenge almost any sense of sharing; yet they 
reveal such disparities that they demand distribution.342 The success 
of the proposed Council requires a solid sense of common interest, of 
committed union, within the context of constitutional federalism. 
B. Interstate Lending of Revenues 
The second proposal is the provision of low-interest loans to fiscal-
ly bankrupt energy-importing areas made available from energy-
producing state revenues.343 A producing state would act in an in-
dividual capacity to assist those areas of the country which are 
340. The federal government does not share any of the royalty revenues it receives from 
leasing the Outer Continental Shelf areas. In 1978, the federal government earned over $1 
billion in royalty income from offshore development in Louisiana alone. LOUISIANA'S FIRST USE 
TAX, supra note 335, at 196. 
341. Some might even say impossible. "The differing tax structures within each state and 
the varying distributions of functional and financial responsibilities of states, counties, 
townships and special districts make it impossible to evaluate - across state boundaries - the 
relative needs of individual districts." FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE MONETARY CONFERENCE, THE PROBLEM OF REDISTRIBUTION OF FEDERAL AND 
STATE FUNDS, 79 (1970). 
342. J. F. HELLIWELL, supra note 337, at 18. Discussing the need for reform in the 
severance tax area, the Wall Street Journal concluded: 
But to get such an approach through Congress, northeastern politicians would have 
to display a sensitivity to Sunbelt concerns that at present totally escapes them. As 
long as they play the issue as another theme in their region-bating, they are going to 
go through one after another of the crushing defeats that Senator Russell Long 
knows so well how to administer. No one, North or South, will benefit from the 
mutual anger that will result. 
Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 106 (citing Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1980). 
343. See Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1 at 107 (citing Minneapolis Star, May 12, 
1980); id. at 94 (citing Washington Post, April 20, 1980). 
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hardest hit by a recessionary economy evidenced by increased tax 
burdens, decreased public services, and high unemployment. A state 
legislature might appropriate annually a certain portion of its 
resource revenues to be made available as loans to other state or local 
government entities. Such an income redistribution system would be 
much more simple to administer than the proposed interstate 
revenue pool. The risks to the producing states are fewer - no funds 
are given away, they are merely loaned; repayment would be secured 
by acceptable collateral;344 and the need for agreement extends only 
to the state legislators and not to other states' representatives. The 
benefits of goodwill and good public relations are potentially sub-
stantial both in terms of commerce and political clout. 
Fashioned along the lines of the Reconstruction Finance Corpora-
tion345 which was established by Congress in 1932 to provide loans to 
farmers in financial distress, a small Board could be created by the 
state legislature. The Board would administer disbursement of loans 
to those government entities which qualify under legislated guide-
lines. The lending factors which might be considered include per 
capita income, current tax efforts, spending programs, and ability to 
repay.346 A limitation could be placed on the amount of loans made to 
anyone government, perhaps computed as a percentage of the total 
funds made available that year. The purpose of the loans would be to 
provide funding for programs which would stimulate the economy of 
a depressed region. Such a redistribution of a portion of resource 
revenues to energy-importing states would ameliorate the disturbing 
fiscal disparities which have been occasioned by energy resource 
development. 
c. Federal Revenue Sharing Revised 
The federal government can also act to reduce the conflict between 
the energy-producing and energy-importing regions of the country. 
In 1972, Congress enacted a program of federal fiscal assistance to 
state and local governments, commonly known as federal revenue 
sharing.347 Congress recognized that it is the state and local govern-
344. Collateral could be provided by a mortgage on property to be used in the proposed proj-
ect. 
345. Pub. L. No.2, 47 Stat. 5, 15 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1932). 
346. The purpose of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation was not to provide a "hand-
out" but was to make available loan funds which were in major part repaid. All loans were fully 
and adequately secured. 75 CONGo REC. H7360-2508 (daily ed. Jan. 22, 1932). See Commerce 
Clause Hearings, supra note 9, at 121 (statement of Charles E. McLure, Jr., Vice-President of 
the Nat'l Bureau of Economic Research). 
347. The Fiscal Assistance to State and Local Governments Act 1972, 31 U.S.C. §§ 
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ments which must bear the brunt of difficult economic problems. The 
purpose of federal revenue sharing is "to provide the states and 
localities with a specified portion of federal individual income tax col-
lections to be used by them in accordance with local needs and 
priorities and without the attachment of strings by the federal 
government."348 A similar program could be enacted to address the 
problem of fiscal strain caused by increased energy costs in an area. 
In general, grants from the federal treasury are distributed to the 
states in proportion to an index computed with five factors.349 One 
element is per capita income; the others are population, urbaniza-
tion, relative use of income taxes, and total tax effort. The lower the 
per capita income and the greater the population, urbanization, state 
income tax, and total tax efforts, the larger will be that state's share 
of federal revenue sharing funds. 350 Tax effort refers to the taxes 
raised from the state's own sources as a fraction of the total personal 
income of the state's residents.35 ! Severance taxes are included in 
the tax effort computation.352 As a result, the energy-producing 
states' tax efforts reflect large resource revenues; those states are 
entitled to a larger portion of federal revenue sharing funds. 353 The 
inequities brought about by this result are patent. 
An alternative to the present revenue sharing system would be 
quite simply to exclude all resource taxes from the sharing computa-
tions. By removing the distortion caused by steeply escalating 
energy values, the resource tax exclusion would equalize the states' 
positions and limit the states' revenue sources to the more stable tax 
bases of property, income, and sales taxes for the purposes of com-
putation. A revenue sharing formula which excluded resource taxes 
would redistribute federal revenues more equitably and would 
stabilize the economic balance between the states.354 Furthermore, 
1221-1265 (1976). 
348. S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & An. 
NEWS 3874. 
349. 31 U.S.C. S 1225(b)(3) (1976). 
350. Id; Coal Severance Tax Hearing, supra note 1, at 103 (citing National Journal, March 
22,1980). 
351. FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MONETARY CON· 
FERENCE, REVENUE SHARING - A CRITICAL VIEW, 43 (1970). 
352. S. REP. No. 1050, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONGo & AD. 
NEWS 3905. 
353. Alaska, even though it is giving away money to its residents, has the highest tax 
burden in the country for federal revenue sharing purposes. Coal Severance Tax Hearing, 
supra note 1, at 106 (citing Wall Street Journal, June 16, 1980). 
354. FINANCING STATE AND LOCAL GoVERNMENT, PROCEEDINGS OF THE MONETARY CON-
FERENCE, REVENUE SHARING - A CRITICAL VIEW, 17-18 (1970). 
1982] COMMONWEALTH EDISON 561 
the contest over the validity of state resource taxes may lessen once 
the impact of that income is removed from the federal revenue shar-
ing system. 
Anyone or more of the three proposals presented herein would 
operate to lessen the conflict between energy-producing and energy-
importing states. Admittedly, an Interstate Council would face 
strong opposition; however, the states may prefer to submit deci-
sions to their sister states where power is wielded among peers 
rather than to lose control over large revenues to the federal govern-
ment whose authority is absolute. The possibility that producing 
states may individually offer loans to qualifying importing states is 
perhaps more viable. Loans may be more politically attractive to pro-
ducing states than would be outright gifts. Importing states may 
neve,rtheless complain that the loan qualification terms set by lender 
states operate to coerce decisionmaking processes of the energy-
importing states, thereby continuing inequitable distribution on 
another level. Both proposals - the Interstate Council and the pro-
ducing state loans - can be effective, but only if each state 
recognizes its mutual dependence upon its sister states. Surely 
economic chaos in one state would eventually affect another's 
resource revenues; just as surely, other states will develop into 
energy producers as new reserves are explored and the balance will 
change once more. The final proposal suggesting revision of federal 
revenue sharing computations to exclude severance tax revenues is 
the most easily accomplished and is the most strongly recommended. 
The three alternatives posited in this article certainly are not the 
only available means to deal with the intricacies of energy resource 
taxation. The federalism established by the Constitution is necessari-
ly a flexible structure, capable of expansion and accommodation. 
Where money is involved - huge amounts of it at that - compro-
mise is not so simply attained. Yet it is here, in the area of resource 
revenues, that federalism must expand to allow the state legislature 
its autonomous judgments; specifically it must accommodate the 
needs of its financially poorer members. 
v. CONCLUSION 
Colstrip, Montana is a small American town. It just happens to be 
located over some of the largest coal reserves in the nation and, 
because of that, five square miles of nearby land is now a coal strip-
mine. Roads have been needed, as well as schools, hospitals, recrea-
tion facilities, and housing in order to provide for a new transient 
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population. The Montana state legislature witnessed the direct im-
pacts of coal development on the original residents of Colstrip - it 
saw the same in many other places. A tax on coal production was im-
posed to generate the revenues needed to mitigate the adverse ef-
fects which coal mining had brought to the state. Certainly, Montana 
wants its coal to be mined - but it demands that the price of coal 
paid by the American public reflects the true social, environmental, 
and future costs which Montana alone must pay. 
The constitutional validity of Montana's 30 percent coal severance 
tax was questioned by the coal producers and their utility company 
customers in the case of Commonwealth Edison Company v. Mon-
tana. The United States Supreme Court upheld the state tax. Apply-
ing a flexible commerce clause test, the Court examined the practical 
effects of the tax. It found that the tax was fairly related to the serv-
ices which were provided by the state and concluded that those who 
ultimately consume Montana coal may be legitimately required to 
pay the tax. The Court also upheld the tax under a supremacy clause 
challenge, finding that no direct conflict existed between the coal 
severance tax and any federal statutes. While acknowledging the 
judiciary's inability to determine an appropriate rate of energy 
resource taxation, the Court left unresolved the question of who 
should decide the appropriate level of energy resource taxation, the 
state legislatures or Congress? 
A state legislature's function is to balance carefully the competing 
interests presented for its consideration. It is capable of considering 
the myriad benefits and costs which directly attend coal develop-
ment. Each state's treasury has had to pay for the impact assistance 
needed by small, rural local governments; the environmental 
monitoring needed to reduce mining's physical damage; and the 
roads needed to transport the coal produced. The state legislature 
must examine both the costs incurred by coal development and the 
existing tax structure before it can develop an equitable revenue-
generating measure. Congressional interference in these state deter-
minations would be unwarranted in light of the federal government's 
role in coal development to date. 
The 1973 OPEC oil embargo precipitated the federal government's 
current encouragement of increased coal consumption. Nonetheless, 
there is no single federal statute which expressly outlines a com-
prehensive national coal policy. While some form of a general federal 
approach can be pieced together from various statutes, such ap-
proach recognizes the validity of the state legislatures as pro-
mulgators of resource taxes. The implementation of federal policy 
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generally has been unclear and ineffective. The Bureau of Land 
Management has been inactive as lessor of the federal lands which 
hold a major portion of western coal reserves; the Internal Revenue 
Service has been generous as a purveyor of economic benefits to the 
electric utilities; and the Interstate Commerce Commission has been 
liberal as regulator of the railroad industry which transports most of 
the coal produced in the West. These federal agencies have not effec-
tuated any kind of cohesive national coal policy - their actions have 
tended to increase prices instead. It also appears that federal policies 
may be responsible for the greater concentration of control of the 
coal industry exercised by the large utilities, energy companies, and 
railroads over a previously competitive coal marketplace. Therefore, 
the federal government's actions in western coal development do not 
evidence a national coal policy which would warrant interference 
with present state taxation of energy resources. 
In deciding an appropriate rate of coal severance taxation, the 
state legislature must consider the possible competitive disadvan-
tages which would result from a high tax rate. Even if that rate is ap-
parently high, to the extent that it is acceptable to the marketplace, 
it will more accurately reflect the socially optimal price of coal than 
would a federally regulated price. Prices of coal must rise, both to 
reflect the true market price of an energy resource and to allow the 
environmental and social costs of production to be internalized. The 
additional cost of a state's severance tax is slight in relation to the 
total cost of coal. Further, it is a small cost to ensure that the re-
newed national emphasis on coal does not result in the costly 
sacrifice of western lands to strip-mining. 
Three alternatives have been proposed as means to reduce the con-
flict between energy-producing and energy-importing regions of the 
country. The alternatives are premised on the assumption that a 
federalist system requires a mutual interdependence among the 
states. The first proposal would create an Interstate Council into 
which every state would pool a portion of its surplus resource 
revenues which would then be disbursed to those states requiring 
special assistance. The second alternative is patterned after the 
Reconstruction Finance Corporation and recommends that low-cost 
financing be made available to those energy-importing localities in 
difficult financial situations; such lending would be done by the 
energy-producing states rather than by the federal government. The 
third alternative concerns reformulation of the present federal 
revenue sharing computations in order to more equitably reflect 
each state's need for assistance. 
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State taxation of energy resources is a troublesome area of both 
federal and state legislative concern. The energy-producing state 
governments must demonstrate control over their revenue generat-
ing abilities - their energy-importing sister states may refuse to pay 
the price exacted. The federal government must likewise exercise 
care in administering its national energy policy, interfering with 
state taxation decisions only when a clear, cohesive national policy is 
threatened. The decision of Commonwealth Edison Company v. Mon-
tana rightly affirms the right of a state to develop a scheme of 
resource taxation in order to shape - if not ultimately to control -
its economic destiny within the federal system. 
